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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
The UNIDROIT Project on Harmonised Substantive Rules regarding Securities Held 
with an Intermediary (‘UNIDROIT Project’), the purpose of which is the unification 
of substantive law rules relating to securities held through intermediaries, currently 
discusses, inter alia, whether to include a right of use within the scope of its future 
instrument. The special thing about the UNIDROIT Project is that it does not only 
consider the right of a security taker to use pledged assets for its own purposes, but 
also the right of an intermediary or custodian1 to do so with the assets of its clients.2
 
The goal of this report is to investigate whether a right of use is in the interests of 
collateral providers generally, and of clients of custodians in particular. 
 
A right of use is the right of X to dispose in his own name and for his own benefit of 
Y’s interest in securities. This report focuses on the legal basis for granting such a 
right of use. Market participants currently establish a right of use on the basis of a 
transfer of ownership or by granting a right of use in connection with a security 
interest.3 Sometimes it is also argued that a right of use can be granted on the basis of 
a purely contractual arrangement. 
 
In the introduction below, the three techniques of granting a right of use on the basis 
of 1) an outright transfer, 2) a proprietary security interest and 3) a contractual 
arrangement will be considered in that order. Because a right of use on the basis of an 
outright transfer is nothing new, this report will focus on a right of use granted on the 
basis of a security interest and of a contractual arrangement. It will be shown in 
chapters on Danish, Dutch, German, Italian and English law that both a security 
interest and a contractual arrangement entailing a right of use are essentially an 
outright transfer. 
 
Today, a right of use on the basis of a security interest is envisaged in market 
documentation under New York law and, by way of statute, in the Collateral 
Directive4, which has yet to be implemented in the national laws of the Member 
States of the European Union.5 The American practice will be examined in this 
                                                 
1 In this report no sharp distinction is made between ‘intermediary’, ‘custodian’ and ‘depository’. All 
three terms refer to entities that administer book-entry securities. Cf. Bank of International Settlements, 
A Glossary of Terms Used in Payment and Settlement Systems, March 2003. 
2 See UNIDROIT 2002, Study LXXVIII – Doc. 1, nr. 10-11. 
3 The outright transfer method is used in the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) for repos, 
in the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA) for securities lending and, if English 
law applies, in the 2001 Margin Provisions for derivatives (published by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, or ISDA). The security interest approach is adopted in the ISDA 2001 Margin 
Provisions in those cases where New York law applies. 
4 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial 
collateral arrangements, Official Journal (‘OJ’), L 168, 27 June 2002, p. 43-50. 
5 Implementation should take place before 27 December 2003. See on the progress of the national 
legislators in respect of the implementation of the Collateral Directive the regularly updated website of 
ISDA (www.isda.org, link to Committees, link to Collateral, link to the updates). Due to 
inconsistencies with the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in respect of 
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introduction. The chapters of this report analyse whether a right of use as envisaged 
in the Collateral Directive is compatible with the property law systems of (in 
alphabetical order) Denmark, Germany and Holland, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
 
The Investment Services Directive (‘ISD’)6 seems to envisage a right of use on the 
basis of contractual consent in the client-custodian relationship. The second indent of 
Article 10 of the ISD allows an investment firm7 to ‘use investors’ assets for its own 
account with the investor’s express consent’.8 The exact meaning of this provision 
will be subject to further discussion in the chapters on Danish and Italian law, and in 
the conclusion to this report. The UNIDROIT Project seems to wish to take this issue 
further and give custodians a general right of use in respect of their clients’ assets (see 
section 4 below). 
 
Essentially, a right of use can be envisaged in two relationships – horizontal and 
vertical. The horizontal right of use relates to the situation in which a collateral 
provider and a collateral taker enter into transactions in commercial markets 
generally. Traditionally, collateralised transactions involving cash and/or securities, 
such as repo or securities lending transactions,9 are entered into between major 
participants in the financial markets (e.g. commercial, investment and central banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, etc.). Note, however, that it is also possible to 
choose to apply the Collateral Directive in respect of transactions with small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Whereas the collateral provider can therefore be anything 
from a small or medium-sized enterprise to a multinational enterprise or bank, the 
collateral taker will in practice usually be a major financial institution.10  
 
The vertical right of use relates to the special situation in which a client grants a right 
of use to his custodian in respect of securities that the custodian holds in custody for 
the client. In this case, the fiduciary relationship between the parties should be taken 
into account. The intermediary should take the interests of clients who have entrusted 
their assets to its custody into consideration. In the chapters on Danish, Dutch 
(custody), Italian and English law, this issue will be given special attention. The legal 
                                                                                                                                            
Securities Held with an Intermediary (adopted in December 2002), the implementation of Article 9 of 
the CD may be affected or even delayed. 
6 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, OJ L 
141, 11 June 1993, p. 27-46. 
7 An investment firm is a custodian of a special kind, which does not only have the goal of 
safeguarding assets, but also of investing the assets that clients have entrusted to its custody for the 
benefit of those clients. 
8 The second indent of Article 10 of the ISD was corrected in OJ L 170, 13 July 1993, p. 32. 
9 ‘Repo’ or ‘repurchase’ transactions can be defined as transactions in which party ‘A’ (seller) sells 
certain securities to party ‘B’ (buyer) for an amount of cash (the purchase price), while at the same time 
committing itself to buying back equivalent securities at a future date for a certain amount of money, 
including an interest component (the re-purchase price). In a securities lending transaction, a lender 
transfers a specific type of securities to a borrower for an amount of cash or other securities, while the 
lender and borrower commit themselves to transferring equivalent securities and/or cash at the end of 
the transaction. In this case the borrower typically pays an interest component. 
10 Applying of the Collateral Directive to situations where the collateral taker is by definition more 
powerful than the collateral provider is undesirable. The collateral taker can in this case dictate the 
terms of the collateral agreement (e.g. if a right of use is granted and how the collateralised assets 
should be valued in the event of a default). The Collateral Directive should therefore not apply to 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. See Article 1(3) of the CD. Cf. the Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee, OJ C 48, 21 February 2002, p. 1-3 (in particular sections 3.3-5); and T. Keijser, 
Repos and Securities Lending Agreements, University of Nijmegen, 2003, p. 47-51. 
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basis for granting a right of use in this case will be investigated, as will ways of 
protecting the interests of clients.11
 
Besides the issue of the legal basis of a right of use, this right can also be considered 
from an accounting, a regulatory, an operational and a tax point of view. These issues 
are mentioned briefly below. The tax issue is elaborated upon more extensively in the 
Tax Appendix to this report. 
 
 
1. The outright transfer method 
 
In the case of an outright transfer12, it is obvious that the new owner has a ‘right of 
use’. He can dispose of the assets he has acquired in any way he deems fit. A number 
of important standard agreements used internationally for collateralised transactions 
envisage the outright transfer of collateral.13 Also under current Dutch and German 
practice, for example, collateral is provided (e.g. in the course of repos and securities 
lending transactions) on the basis of an outright transfer. Outright transfers are a 
perfectly feasible way of structuring collateralised transactions including a right of 
use. Outright transfers are the standard under American law14, and are also sanctioned 
by Article 6 of the Collateral Directive. 
 
An outright transfer has the advantage that the collateral provider knows exactly what 
is happening. If he gives someone a collateral interest in respect of his assets, 
including the right to dispose of them, he loses his ownership right. Particularly in the 
relationship between a client and a custodian, it seems important that the client should 
be aware of what right he is actually granting a custodian. If he grants a custodian a 
right of use on the basis of a security interest or on the basis of a contract, he might 
not be aware that he is actually giving up his ownership right. As will be 
demonstrated below, under for example current Dutch and English practice, a 
custodian can only be granted a right of use on the basis of an unambiguous transfer 
of ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Note that the Collateral Directive applies to transactions on the Over-The-Counter market generally, 
but will also be applicable if a client provides collateral to its custodian. 
12 In this report no sharp distinction is made between ‘outright transfer’, ‘title transfer’ and ‘transfer of 
ownership’. All three terms refer to the passing of a property right or an interest of a proprietary nature 
from one party to another. 
13 See for example the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA; available on www.isma.com 
and www.bondmarkets.com), the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA; cf. 
www.isla.co.uk), the 2001 ISDA Margin Provisions (Part 3; English law), or the European Master 
Agreement for Financial Transactions (cf. www.fbe.be). 
14 See Uniform Commercial Code; 2002 edition; Official Text and Comments, West Group, (hereafter: 
‘UCC (2002 edition)’), p. 676-678 on repurchase and securities lending transactions. Cf. the outright 
transfer approach taken in the standard agreements for repurchase and securities lending transactions 
published by The Bond Market Association (TBMA) in 1996 and 2000 respectively (available on 
www.bondmarkets.com). 
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2. The security interest approach 
 
At present, the provision of a right of use on the basis of a security interest is 
impossible in most, if not all, European jurisdictions. The Collateral Directive will 
change this situation.15
 
Collateral in the sense of the Collateral Directive serves two functions. A collateral 
taker uses it for recovery purposes and also to enter into further trades. Both functions 
are guaranteed in the case of a transfer of ownership. The new owner has the 
strongest imaginable ‘security interest’ and can dispose of the transferred assets as he 
pleases. The European legislator has now also enabled a second way of providing 
collateral. On the basis of Article 5 of the Collateral Directive, a right of use of 
collateral can be granted on the basis of a security interest. The security interest 
guarantees the possibility of recovery, the right of use the tradeability.16
 
On the basis of Article 5 of the CD, a right of disposal can be granted to a collateral 
taker. This means that a collateral taker has the right to transfer ownership of 
encumbered assets to a third party or to vest a security interest over those assets for 
the benefit of that third party. The collateral taker in return has an obligation to 
deliver equivalent assets to the collateral provider at the end of a transaction. These 
equivalent assets are deemed to have been owned by the collateral provider from the 
outset. This latter phenomenon will be referred to hereafter as ‘proprietary 
substitution’.17
 
The right of use under the Collateral Directive is not in the interest of collateral 
providers. First, a general (i.e. also if there is no event of default) right for a secured 
party to dispose of pledged assets is incompatible with the property law systems of 
many, if not all, European countries. One may wonder if a collateral provider is not 
actually transferring ownership when he grants a right of use, in which case he is left 
with a contractual claim towards the collateral taker from the outset. Second, the 
collateral provider in any case has nothing more than a contractual claim from the 
moment the collateral taker exercises his right of use.18 Generally, if you vest a 
security interest, you expect to remain owner of the collateral.19 However, under the 
regime of the Collateral Directive, collateral providers are only left with a contractual 
claim. 
 
Note that the collateral provider’s contractual claim enjoys enhanced protection in the 
event of insolvency, because contractual set-off provisions are enforceable under the 
regime of the Collateral Directive. However, this is of no avail to the collateral 
                                                 
15 Cf. the Opinion of the European Central Bank in respect of the Collateral Directive, OJ C 196, 12 
July 2001, p. 10-13, section 16. 
16 See on the two functions of collateral: Keijser (2003), p. 3-10. 
17 Note that under the regime of the Collateral Directive a collateral provider is the owner of assets at 
the outset of a transaction (‘moment 1’), is very likely to be left with a contractual claim during the 
entire course of the transaction (‘moment 2’), and will only become owner again (on the basis of 
proprietary substitution) at the moment the collateral taker fulfils its obligation to deliver equivalent 
assets, usually at the end of the transaction (‘moment 3’). 
18 Cf. Article 5(2) of the CD. 
19 Even though Article 5 of the CD requires ‘consent’ to a right of use, it is doubtful that all collateral 
providers (including clients of custodians) realise that they actually grant a security interest (a limited 
right!) combined with a general right to dispose. 
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provider if the prices of the securities he has provided to the collateral taker go up 
considerably, and in the absence of proper margin arrangements that take changes in 
market prices into account. In this case, the collateral provider has an unsecured 
exposure to the risks of the collateral taker. 
 
In many, if not all, European jurisdictions, a right of use on the basis of a security 
interest is incompatible with the current property law system. This is because a 
security interest only gives a collateral taker the right to dispose of collateral if there 
is an event of default. Until that moment, he has a duty of care and cannot appropriate 
the underlying assets (these two issues are stressed in the Dutch and German legal 
systems), whereas the collateral taker should have the right of redemption until the 
event of default takes place (this issue, which is basically the reverse side of the coin, 
is the focus in the English legal analysis). 
 
The chapters below investigate how the ‘right of use’ under the Collateral Directive 
should be implemented. Whereas the legal theory of execution of pledged assets, re-
pledge, the sale on commission and the consignment sale cannot serve as a sufficient 
basis for implementing the right of use, the theory of irregular pledge does reflect 
what actually happens. An irregular pledge basically entails a transfer of ownership. 
The irregular pledge will be discussed in the chapters on the Danish, German and 
Dutch legal systems, and will be the focus of the chapter on Italian law. 
 
Note that the right of use as envisaged in the Collateral Directive does not only apply 
to the horizontal relationship between a collateral provider and a collateral taker, but 
also if a client provides collateral to its custodian. The Collateral Directive therefore 
enables custodians to dispose of their clients’ assets on the basis of a security interest. 
The consequences of this probably unintended effect of the Collateral Directive will 
be discussed in depth in the chapters on the client-custodian relationship under 
Danish and Dutch law. Clients may very well not expect to lose their ownership right 
when they grant a security interest to their custodian, because they expect to remain 
owner until an event of default has taken place. 
 
Note that the general civil law analysis in the chapters on Danish, German and Dutch, 
Italian and English law is to a large extent limited to the right of use on the basis of a 
security interest in a ‘horizontal’ relationship. In the ‘vertical’ relationship between a 
client and a custodian, the dogmatic considerations are, however, exactly the same. 
There is, however, an additional element that should be taken into account in this 
case. The relation between client and custodian is a special one (e.g. a trust or a 
comparable legal relationship) entailing a fiduciary duty of the custodian to take the 
interests of its clients into account. The difference in power between clients and 
custodians should be balanced. A custodian should take the interests of clients into 
account. In this case it is less desirable for a client who pledges assets to his custodian 
to think he is the owner of the assets, while he has actually transferred his ownership 
right to the custodian. It is submitted that an unambiguous transfer of ownership by 
the client to the custodian serves the interests of both parties. The client realises he 
loses his proprietary interest, and the custodian is free to dispose of the transferred 
assets as he wishes. As a result, optimal investor protection is guaranteed. 
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3. American law∗
 
After a general section on the right of use based on a security interest it is appropriate 
to investigate the American approach. This section examines, if a right of use can be 
granted on the basis of a security interest under American law. Particular attention 
will be paid to the meaning of the word ‘use’ in this context. Can a ‘right of use’ 
mean an unlimited ‘right of disposal’ for own business purposes (i.e. for example the 
right to sell encumbered securities or to re-pledge them)? 
 
Security interests over securities and securities entitlements20
Under U.S. law securities held with intermediaries are called ‘securities entitlements’ 
to distinguish them from certificated and uncertificated securities which are held 
directly from issuers of the securities. Part 5 of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (‘UCC’) deals with securities entitlements. Earlier Parts deal with certificated 
and uncertificated securities. Article 9 of the UCC deals with security interests in all 
kinds of personal property, including securities and securities entitlements. 
 
Owners of securities and securities entitlements commonly use them as collateral for 
secured loans from their intermediaries (brokers). Rarely, if ever, would a loan be for 
100% of the value of the property. The arrangement would provide for a ‘margin’ of 
equity. If the value of the entitlements should go down, there would be a ‘margin call’ 
to pay down the loan or provide additional collateral. 
 
To ‘perfect’ their security interests in securities or securities entitlements, 
intermediaries must take ‘control’ of the property. ‘Control’ means different things 
for securities and entitlements, but the central idea is that the intermediaries must 
have power to dispose of the collateral. Disposition can mean many things, including 
outright sale. The primary reason for outright sale would be foreclosure on collateral 
when a debtor is in default. 
 
Without default, the situation of margin lending results in dividing the beneficial 
rights in the property between the lender and the borrower. The lender has its security 
interest. The owner has the equity remainder interest. U.S. law provides that lenders 
can ‘use’ their portion of the property in many ways. The primary one, commercially, 
is re-pledge or re-hypothecation.21 The intermediaries can use only their portion of 
the value of the collateral, they cannot invade the owners’ portion.22
 
If so agreed, a secured party with possession of the collateral may also ‘use or 
operate’ collateral under Article 9-207(b)(4) of the UCC. In the light of case law on 
this use or operation, it is unlikely, however, that a collateral taker has a right to sell 
the encumbered assets outright unless there is a default. 23 Use or operation normally 
                                                 
∗ The author is grateful to Professor C. Reitz for his supportive views in respect of the American law 
analysis. 
20 A considerable part of this subsection is based on an e-mail received from Professor Reitz. The 
author alone is responsible for the resulting text. 
21 Cf. Article 9-207(c)(3) of the UCC. 
22 Cf. the Official Comments on Article 9-207(c)(3) of the UCC in the UCC (2002 edition), cit. 
(footnote 14), p. 858-861 (in particular sections 5 and 6). 
23 See J. Willis (managing editor), Uniform Commercial Code; Case Digest, Callaghan & Company, 
(1984 Revision of Volume 6), Volume 6A, p. 509-513. 
 6
means enjoying an asset (e.g. driving a pledged car), without infringing upon the 
substance of the asset (the effect of which is that the rights of the owner of the asset 
are safeguarded). An outright sale is by definition an infringement of the original 
owner’s right. 
 
Article 9 of the UCC places legal limits on lenders’ use of collateral that is in their 
control. The relevant section for securities and entitlements is 9-207(c) of the UCC. 
Without default, this section does not permit outright sale, which would compromise 
the owners’ interest in their equity. This arrangement is fairly simple for certificated 
and uncertificated securities. It is worked out in similar fashion for entitlements in 
Part 5 of Article 8 of the UCC. 
 
The commercial law provisions in the UCC are buttressed by stringent regulations of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) on use of ‘customer property’. 
 
The property law of the UCC and SEC regulatory law are consistent with contract 
arrangements between some intermediaries and some of their customers that give the 
intermediaries additional power over the collateral. This additional power is not 
provided by law. It arises by agreement and can be conditioned by that agreement. A 
common clause in such contracts is authorization to sell securities or entitlements. 
There are a number of reasons for this kind of contract clause. If sales occur, rights in 
the proceeds would be determined by the pre-sale rights in the collateral. 
 
Under American law a secured party can therefore never dispose as if it is the full 
owner and without taking the collateral provider’s proprietary interests into account. 
On the basis of Article 9-207 of the UCC the secured party must respect the original 
owner’s remaining equity interest. In certain cases an enhanced right of disposal can 
be granted on the basis of contractual provisions, but in this case the original owner 
has a proprietary interest in the proceeds of the sale. 
 
Margin lending facilities 
In any case it is clear that the margin lending practice in the U.S. cannot serve as an 
explanation of a general right of disposal for a collateral taker.24 In the course of 
‘margin account’ or ‘margin lending’ facilities 1) a custodian attracts money from a 
third party, 2) which money is paid to the custodian’s client, so that 3) the client can 
acquire assets, typically securities, in the market. Because the third party wants to be 
secured, 4) the client grants a right of pledge over its securities to the custodian, so 
that 5) the custodian can vest a right of re-pledge for the benefit of the third party. 
The client should under current regulations give explicit consent to a re-pledge by the 
custodian. This arrangement is to the benefit of the client, because in effect the re-
pledge secures a cash flow from a third party that the client can use to acquire 
                                                 
24 Cf. the Report of the Second Session of the UNIDROIT Study Group for the Preparation of 
Harmonised Substantive Law Rules regarding Securities Held with an Intermediary (‘UNIDROIT 
Second Session Report’). Section 2.7(2) of this report suggests incorrectly that the margin lending 
practice in the UK and the US is a good starting point for introducing a general right for custodians to 
dispose of their clients’ assets for their own business purposes. 
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securities. A custodian, therefore, does not have the right to re-pledge, let alone sell 
its client’s assets in order to pursue its own commercial purposes.25
 
The special case of the New York derivatives market 
In the New York derivatives market a right to ‘use’ securities means a right for the 
secured party to dispose of them for its own benefit without any limitation. Under 
Section 2.2(c) of the 2001 ISDA Margin Provisions (New York law) concerning the 
‘Use of Margin Received’ a secured party will: 
 
‘notwithstanding Section 9-207 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code, 
have the right to: (A) sell, pledge, rehypothecate, assign, invest, use, 
commingle or otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use in its business, any 
Margin Received it holds, free from any claim or right of any nature 
whatsoever of the Provider, including any equity or right of redemption by the 
Provider […]’.26
 
This interpretation of the word ‘use’ is not in line with what is commonly meant by 
the word ‘use’, i.e. the act of employing a thing, without destroying or wasting that 
thing, and not to sell that thing or encumber it with a security interest.27
 
The interpretation of the word ‘use’ in the ISDA Margin Provisions is in any case 
wider than that under Article 9-207 of the UCC. Whereas a collateral taker ‘using’ 
assets under Article 9-207 of the UCC should always take the proprietary interest of 
the collateral provider into account, the ISDA Margin Provisions exclude any such 
interest. Also, the ISDA Margin Provisions do not envisage any proprietary interest 
for the collateral provider in the proceeds of a disposal. The Margin Provisions state 
that the collateral taker can use the collateral provider’s assets ‘free from any claim or 
right of any nature whatsoever, […] including any equity or right of redemption’. 
Because the collateral provider has no proprietary right whatsoever, the structure of 
the ISDA Margin Provisions is essentially that of an outright transfer. 
 
Outright transfer 
A collateral provider can transfer ownership of assets to a collateral taker, for 
example on the basis of a sale (Article 2 of the UCC). In this case, it is obvious that 
the collateral taker has an unlimited right to dispose of the assets transferred. Note 
that under American law, standard collateralised transactions (other than margin 
transfers under derivatives transactions) such as repos and securities lending 
transactions are not structured on the basis of a security interest but as an outright 
transfer.28
 
                                                 
25 See the UCC (2002 edition), p. 770; and S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Indirectly Held Securities and Intermediary 
Risk’, Uniform Law Review / Revue de droit uniforme, 2001-2, p. 291. Cf. the section on prime 
brokerage in chapter 5 on English law below. 
26 Cf. in almost the same wording Paragraph 6(c) of the 1994 New York Annex (ISDA Credit Support 
Documents). The ISDA Credit Support Documents are the predecessor of the 2001 ISDA Margin 
Provisions. 
27 Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Co., 1979, p. 1382-1384 (‘use’ and ‘usufruct’). 
28 Cf. the GMRA, the GMSLA and the TBMA standard agreements. 
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Conclusion 
The European provisions concerning an unlimited right of use in the Collateral 
Directive, and possibly in the Investment Services Directive (see section 4 below) 
have been enacted in the belief that such unrestricted ‘use’ is also possible under 
American law.29 ‘Use’ in the sense of Article 9 of the UCC must, however, be 
interpreted in such a way that the proprietary interests of the original owner are taken 
into account. Even if contractual provisions that allow a collateral taker to dispose of 
encumbered assets are enforceable between certain market participants, these 
provisions cannot entail that the pre-sale rights of the collateral provider are 
neglected. An unlimited right of disposal can under American law only be granted on 
the basis of an outright transfer of ownership. 
 
The ISDA Margin Provisions (New York law) envisage a general right of disposal on 
the basis of a security interest. The collateral provider, however, is not given any 
claim of a proprietary nature whatsoever. Such an approach is not compatible with the 
essence of a security interest. The structure envisaged in the ISDA Margin Provisions 
is therefore very similar to that of an outright transfer. 
 
 
4. A right of use on a contractual basis? 
 
The Report of the Second Session of the UNIDROIT Study Group for the Preparation 
of Harmonised Substantive Law Rules regarding Securities Held with an 
Intermediary (‘UNIDROIT Second Session Report’)30 envisages a right of use both 
for collateral takers in indirect holding systems and for custodians. This right of use 
can be granted on the basis of consent, i.e. a purely contractual arrangement. 
 
Consent-based transfer techniques are not the novelty here. In a number of European 
jurisdictions (e.g. Italy and France) a transfer of title derives automatically from a 
contractual provision and has effects erga omnes. An act of delivery is not required in 
this case for a transfer of ownership to occur.31 The issue here is that clients do not 
expect to transfer ownership when they consent to ‘use’. When a client asks a 
custodian to manage his assets he does not expect that the custodian will start dealing 
in his assets for its own benefit. This is misleading. 
 
Different types of interests of a proprietary nature in book-entry securities can be 
distinguished: 1) a direct ownership interest (e.g. the principle under Danish law), 2) a 
co-ownership interest in a fungible pool of securities (e.g. the Dutch law approach in 
case of holdings that fall under the regime of the Securities Giro Transfer Act); 3) a 
‘securities entitlement’ (i.e. a right sui generis – the American law approach)32; 4) the 
                                                 
29 Cf. for example J. Benjamin, Interests in Securities; A Proprietary Law Analysis of the International 
Securities Markets, Oxford, 2000, p.111 (footnote 74). 
30 UNIDROIT 2003, Study LXXVIII, Doc.7. Note that this draft report is subject to approval by the 
Study Group. 
31 In other countries on the other hand, such as Germany and The Netherlands, the starting point is that 
consent is not sufficient for a transfer of ownership and that an act of delivery is also required. 
32 See Part 5 of Article 8 of the UCC and the Explanatory Comments thereto in the UCC (2002 
edition), cit. (footnote 14). Unlike under English law (see chapter 5 below), the trust concept is not 
used under American law in order to characterise the relationship between client and custodian. See the 
UCC (2002 edition), p. 674 (section 5). 
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right of a beneficiary in a trust situation (e.g. the English law approach).33 Such 
proprietary interests of investors deserve protection.34
 
The UNIDROIT Second Session Report envisages a right of use for custodians in 
respect of the securities of their clients on the mere basis of the contractual consent of 
those clients. On the basis of this contractual consent investors lose their proprietary 
claim. As palliatives, the Second Session Report suggests 1) limitations as far as the 
volume of securities that can be used is concerned (e.g. a certain percentage) and 2) 
limitations as far as the length of the use is concerned (e.g. only short-term 
transactions).35 However, these makeshift measures conceal a violation of the 
interests of clients of custodians. In the event of the custodian’s insolvency they are 
left with nothing but a contractual claim. 
 
Segregation 
The UNIDROIT Second Session Report suggests that segregation ‘eases the pain’ 
connected with a general right of use.36 It may be true that the segregation of the 
custodian’s assets from those of investors is desirable from a general investor 
protection point of view, but it is of no relevance in a right of use situation. If a 
custodian has a right of use, it disposes of its clients’ assets lawfully for its own 
benefit. It is not relevant if these assets are held on a segregated or non-segregated 
basis. The investor will lose his proprietary claim.37
 
Perfect match system 
Under American law, a crucial investor protection mechanism is that a custodian 
should always have enough assets in place in order to meet its clients’ claims (see 
Article 8-504 of the UCC). This is called the ‘perfect match system’. A custodian 
must take clients’ interests into account and can only dispose of its own share of a 
pool of assets. If it disposes of more, it is in breach of its obligation to hold sufficient 
assets to satisfy its clients’ claims. A custodian therefore does not have the right to 
dispose of its clients’ assets for the benefit of its own business.38 The perfect match 
                                                 
33 Contractual rights in respect of securities will not be considered. 
34 Cf. on the different types of interests in securities the Report of the European Financial Market 
Lawyers Group (EFMLG), Harmonisation of the Legal Framework for Rights Evidenced by Book-
Entries in respect of Certain Financial Instruments in the European Union, June 2003, section I(A)(3). 
The Second Giovannini Report proposes to standardise the treatment of property rights in securities 
across the European Union. See The Giovannini Group, Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement 
Arrangements, Brussels, April 2003, (‘Second Giovannini Report’), p. 12-18. 
35 See section 2.7(2) of the UNIDROIT Second Session Report. The quality of the third party to whom 
the securities have been sold or pledged is not relevant in this respect; to the clients it is the quality of 
the custodian that matters (and in particular if the custodian has enough assets in place, or – even 
though this does not guarantee the interests of clients in a satisfactory way, because they are left with a 
contractual claim in this case – is in a position to buy or redeem such assets). 
36 See section 2.7(2) of the UNIDROIT Second Session Report. 
37 In Denmark (see chapter 1 below) and the United Kingdom (see chapter 5 below), the underlying 
principle is that assets of investors and custodians are held on a segregated basis. In The Netherlands 
(see chapter 3 below) and in the United States (see the UCC (2002 edition), p. 766) the assets of clients 
and custodians are often held together on a commingled basis. See on segregation also the EFMLG 
Report (2003), p. 18-19. 
38 Note, however, that third party purchasers are generally protected, unless they act in bad faith. This 
guarantees a smooth functioning of the securities markets, without cumbersome investigation duties 
hindering liquidity. Cf. the UCC (2002 edition), p. 767-769. 
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system is also a general investor protection mechanism which is not specifically 
relevant in a right of use scenario.39
 
The idea that securities should be treated in the same way as money should be 
rejected. The claims of customers in respect of money are contractual claims. In the 
case of cash accounts, banks are not obliged to have enough cash available to pay all 
customers. The perfect match system does not apply in this case. Note that as far as 
securities are concerned, investors in Europe are usually given a claim of a 
proprietary nature (see above). Also, investors in the United States are given a claim 
of a proprietary nature protected by a perfect match system. Current American and 
European standards in relation to securities holdings are therefore essentially different 
from those in relation to cash accounts. 
 
This means that when a custodian disposes of assets in a fungible pool, it should not 
be allowed to touch clients’ assets for its own benefit, unless an explicit outright 
transfer has taken place (the Dutch, Danish, Italian and English law approach), or 
unless it keeps enough assets in place to satisfy all clients’ claims (the American law 
approach). 
 
The idea of a custodian’s right of use based on consent that gives the custodian the 
right to dispose of the assets of its clients for its own benefit, must be rejected. It 
seriously infringes these clients’ interests. A client only expects to lose his property 
claim after an unequivocal transfer of his proprietary interest and certainly not when 
he consents to ‘use’ by the custodian. 
 
 
5. Economic impact 
 
The argument that has been presented in favour of a right of use on the basis of a 
security interest is the positive effect it has on the liquidity of the financial markets.40 
Exactly the same effect can, however, be reached by way of the outright transfer 
technique. This latter option is the current market standard for collateralised 
transactions in, for example, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Germany. 
The most obvious downside of the right of use on the basis of a security interest or 
mere consent is that collateral providers and investors may not expect to lose their 
ownership interest when granting a right of ‘use’. This disadvantage is not present in 
the case of an unambiguous transfer of ownership. The goal of liquid markets can be 
reached perfectly well by using the outright transfer technique, which honours the 
interests of all parties involved. 
 
 
6. Voting rights and income payments 
 
An owner of securities is entitled to execute voting rights and receive income 
payments made on those securities. It is therefore important for the institutions that 
issued the securities concerned to determine whether a right of use leads to a change 
                                                 
39 Cf. section 2.7(2) of the UNIDROIT Second Session Report; and the Second Giovannini Report, p. 
12-18. 
40 Cf. Recital 19 of the CD and the ECB Opinion, cit. (footnote 15), section 16. 
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in ownership and at what moment. As soon as a transfer of ownership takes place, the 
new owner has the right to vote and to receive income payments. 
 
 
7. Accounting, capital adequacy, and registration by custodians 
 
Accounting issues, the capital adequacy treatment of transactions with a right of use, 
and the way a right of use should be registered by custodians are not the focus of this 
report. Accountants should decide who is shown in the books as the legal owner of 
securities. Regulators should determine what capital adequacy regime applies in the 
case a right of use has been granted. And custodians should show in their records that 
a general right of disposal has been granted in respect of securities on the basis of a 
security interest or contractual consent. On the basis of the legal analysis in the 
chapters below it is submitted that the right of use should be treated as an outright 
transfer. 
 
 
8. Tax 
 
As noted above, the tax treatment of a right of use should also be considered. Should 
a transaction involving a right of use be treated as a security interest or an outright 
transfer for tax purposes? The Tax Appendix to this report investigates what the 
consequences of the right of use of the Collateral Directive will be from a tax point of 
view. The effect on different taxes will be considered. The focus will be on 
consequences for corporate income tax and withholding tax, but some attention will 
also be paid to participation exemptions. 
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1. RIGHT OF USE UNDER DANISH LAW∗
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the legal aspects of a right of use under Danish law. 
 
The chapter is divided into two main sections – a section dealing with the ‘horizontal’ 
relationship, i.e. the right of use of a collateral taker with a security interest over 
securities (section 1), and a section dealing with the ‘vertical relationship’, i.e. the 
right of use of a custodian holding securities on behalf of its clients (section 2). The 
distinction between vertical and horizontal rights of use is made for structural and 
overview purposes and it should be noted that the issues applicable to the horizontal 
relationship, i.e. the relationship between collateral provider and collateral taker, 
generally also apply to the relationship between a custodian and its clients (the 
vertical relationship). 
 
Danish law provides for a right of use in the vertical relationship. A dealer in 
securities41 can use securities in its custody for its own benefit, provided that the 
client explicitly consents to the dealer’s use.42 A corresponding provision does not 
currently exist under Danish law in the horizontal relationship, but is envisaged by 
Article 5 of the European Collateral Directive (‘CD’)43.44
 
Section 1 below will primarily focus on the implementation of Article 5 of the CD in 
Danish law by investigating if similar Danish legal concepts exist. Section 2 on the 
vertical relationship will deal with the theory of custody holdings under Danish law 
and with the special statutory rules for a dealer in securities’ right to dispose of the 
securities in its custody. 
 
 
1. The relationship between a collateral provider and a collateral taker 
 
The right of use in Article 5 of the Collateral Directive entails a general right of 
disposal for a collateral taker in respect of securities provided to it as collateral (if 
such a right has been agreed),45 as well as proprietary substitution. Because these 
legal issues are new to Danish law, they will be considered from a Danish law 
perspective below, in sections 1.A and 1.B respectively. 
                                                 
∗ The author is grateful to Professor Bang-Pedersen for his constructive remarks in respect of this 
chapter. 
41 A dealer in securities is a credit institution, an investment company or a mortgage credit institute. 
See Article 4(1) of the Danish Securities Trading Act (‘STA’), Act No. 587 of 9 July 2002. 
42 See Article 3b(2) of the Danish Financial Business Act (‘FBA’), Act no. 660 of 7 August 2002. 
Article 3b of the FBA is the implementation of the second indent of Article 10 of the Investment 
Services Directive (see footnotes 6 and 8 above). See further section 2 below. 
43 See footnote 4 above. 
44 At the time of writing the implementation of the Collateral Directive is being discussed by a working 
group established by the Danish Ministry of Justice. The working group has not yet presented a draft. 
Note however that the working group established by the Danish Ministry of Justice has implied that it 
will put forward as broad an implementation of the Collateral Directive as possible. See the ISDA 
website, referred to in footnote 5 above. 
45 Danish: Brugsret for panthaver til de pantsatte vaerdipapirer. 
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Because a right of use is possible in the vertical relationship, it is likely that the 
implementation of Article 5 of the CD will follow the same structure, i.e. a formula 
based on contractual consent.46 In this context, it should be noted that the following 
analysis assumes that a ‘right of use’-clause contained in a horizontal agreement will 
not be deemed invalid under the Danish Contract Act. This situation might become 
relevant if the Directive is implemented without narrowing its scope and if the 
Collateral Directive covers small- and medium- sized enterprises.47 In this case, a 
Danish court might deem a ‘right of use’-clause contained in a collateral agreement to 
be unfair to the collateral provider.48
 
 
A. Right of disposal under Danish law 
 
By a right of use, Article 5 of the CD means that the collateral taker can – if so agreed 
– dispose of the pledged securities as the owner of those securities.49 Danish law only 
allows a collateral taker to dispose of assets provided to it as collateral (‘pant’ or 
‘sikkerhed’) in special circumstances. 
 
A right of disposal in the horizontal relationship can occur under current law in 
relation to a realisation (section 1.1 below). Second, a collateral taker can dispose of 
received collateral by re-pledging it for the benefit of a third party (section 1.2). 
Under reservation of title arrangements (or proprietary representation), the 
‘purchaser’ has a limited right to dispose of assets to which the ‘seller’ has reserved 
title (section 1.3). The notions of ‘regular’ as opposed to ‘irregular’ usufruct 
arrangements and of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ pledge constructions under Danish law 
will be analysed in sections 1.4 and 1.5. Finally, the issue of a consent-based right of 
disposal and the issue of when the collateral provider loses its ownership rights will 
be analysed in section 1.6. 
 
 
1.1 Realisation 
 
Realisation is a collateral taker’s right to realise received collateral. Realisation under 
Danish law can take place in the event of a breach by the collateral provider of the 
underlying obligation (in relation to which the security interest is vested).50
 
                                                 
46 See Article 3b of the FBA and cf. section 2 below regarding the vertical relation. 
47 See Article 1(2)(e) of the CD. The Collateral Directive contains an opt-out provision in Article 1(3), 
which allows the scope to be narrowed. 
48 See Article 36 of the Danish Contract Act. This could be so due to – for example – the possible 
difference in (economic) bargaining power between the collateral provider and the collateral taker (for 
example a bank). This is an argument to restrict a right of use to parties that are equal, e.g. banks. This 
is the solution chosen by the Swedish government in the course of the implementation of the Collateral 
Directive into Swedish law (see DS 2003.38). 
49 Cf. Article 2(1)(m) of the CD. 
50 See W.E von Eyben: Panterettigheder (1958), p. 300 and Rordam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 335 
(mortgage), p. 355 (pledge), p. 375 (chattel mortgage) and p. 413 (claims). Note that the realisation of 
securities should follow the specific rules set out in Article 538(2) of the Danish Administration of 
Justice Act according to which the realisation of securities can only take place through a sale by a 
member of the Danish Stock Exchange or a bank. See Rordam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 413. 
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Realisation can therefore only take place in the event of the collateral provider’s 
default. Contrary hereto, the Collateral Directive assumes a general right of disposal, 
i.e. a right to dispose regardless of whether the collateral provider has defaulted. The 
right of use under the Collateral Directive therefore goes further, as it entails a right to 
dispose under ‘normal circumstances’. Realisation under Danish law cannot therefore 
serve as a basis for implementing the right of use. 
 
 
1.2 Re-pledge 
 
The position on re-pledging under Danish law is similar to that on the right of use. 
 
Re-pledging (‘frempantsaetning’) should be understood as a collateral taker’s right to 
dispose of his right of pledge over assets received as collateral from a collateral 
provider and/or a right of disposal of the underlying secured claim for the benefit of a 
third party. Danish law allows for a detachment of the right of pledge from the 
underlying claim in relation to which the pledge is vested. This means that the right of 
pledge and the secured claim can be re-pledged together or separately. 
 
Re-pledging is, however, subject to certain restrictions. Under Danish law, the 
collateral taker’s re-pledging must be confined to the amount of the secured claim, 
which means that the re-pledge cannot exceed the value of the original pledge.51
 
‘Frempantsaetning’ under Danish law does not mean that the collateral provider’s 
asset is encumbered with an ‘extra’ security interest. Encumbrance with an extra 
security interest would be a prerogative reserved for the collateral provider. 
‘Frempantsaetning’ merely entails a disposal of the rights originally received from 
the collateral provider. Therefore this situation is not equivalent to the right of use 
under the Collateral Directive, which allows a collateral taker to dispose of the assets 
of the collateral provider. 
 
From the above it also follows that re-pledging – as understood under Danish law – 
cannot cover a right to sell the received collateral to a third party (and not just a right 
to re-pledge). The right of re-pledge under Danish law can never entail allowing a 
collateral taker a right to transfer ownership of collateralised assets. Re-pledging 
cannot therefore be a satisfactory explanation for the right of use under the Collateral 
Directive. 
 
 
1.3 Proprietary representation 
 
The two main characteristics envisaged by the right of use under the Collateral 
Directive are the collateral provider’s retention of title to the asset and the collateral 
taker’s right of disposal. Reservation of title arrangements – such as the conditional 
                                                 
51 See Danish Code (Danske Lov) Article 5-7-4. Case law and literature are in accordance herewith, see 
e.g. UfR 1984.123H and Rordam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 110ff (mortgages), p. 339ff (pledge), 
p. 359 (chattel mortgage). 
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sale and the consignment sale52 – under Danish law contain the ‘retention of title’-
feature. The following subsections analyse to what extent reservation of title 
arrangements allow for a right of disposal in order to determine whether these 
arrangements are a suitable basis for implementing Article 5 of the Collateral 
Directive. 
 
 
a. The conditional sale 
 
A valid reservation of title under Danish law can be made by way of a conditional 
sale.53 The conditional sale is characterised by the fact that the seller retains 
ownership of the goods concerned (of course after having delivered them) until the 
purchaser has paid.54
 
The question is to what extent the purchaser can dispose of an asset subject to a 
conditional sale. The principle under Danish law is that the purchaser has the rights of 
an owner but must respect the underlying reservation of title. This means that the 
purchaser can, inter alia, let the asset to a third party and agree to take the asset out of 
the country. The right of disposal also grants the purchaser the right to encumber the 
asset with a security interest, provided that the security interest respects the 
underlying reservation of title.55 The right of disposal does, however, not allow the 
purchaser to sell the asset on to a third party.56
 
In the event of a purchaser’s wrongful sale to a third party, the starting point under 
Danish law is that the seller can trace the assets and can enforce his right against third 
parties who have acquired the asset in good faith and against creditors.57 In case law, 
some exceptions have been made to this principle where a seller is careless or 
passive, in cases of reputed ownership58 and in consignment sales59. 
 
                                                 
52 The sale on commission also constitutes a reservation of title arrangement. However, since the 
central feature of the sale on commission is that the commission agent does not act in its own interest – 
which is exactly the case in a ‘right of use’-situation – it will not be further investigated in this chapter. 
53 Danish: Salg med ejendomsforbehold. See Article 28(2) of the Danish Sale of Goods Act. 
54 The rules relating to conditional sales are contained in the Danish Sale of Goods Act, the Danish 
Credit Agreements Act and any conditional sale agreement as entered into by the parties. 
55 There is however the risk that the security interest will be worth nothing in the event of the seller’s 
enforcement of his ownership right. Also, it should be noted that these rights are normally restricted by 
the conditional sales agreement, and actions in breach of this agreement would be an event of default. 
56 See Werlauff & Lynge Andersen: Kreditretten (1995), p. 123, and Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 
1 (1995), p. 151. This would make it a consignment sale (see above). 
57 Danish law authorises revendication in the cases of theft and unauthorised disposals of goods by a 
pledgee, borrower or custodian and the goods may be revendicated even from a party who acquires 
them in good faith in the market. The explicit right of revendication is therefore unconditional and it is 
indisputable that good faith is no admissible defence. See Article 82 of the Danish Insolvency Act and 
Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 181 and Lynge Andersen & Werlauff (1995): 
Kreditretten, p. 123. It is questionable if the same will apply in relation to securities holdings due to the 
registration system applicable to securities. See Article 36 of Executive Order 925 of 17/10/1996 (Bkg 
925 of 17/10/1996) concerning the Book-Entry etc. of Electronic Securities in a Central Securities 
Depository (‘Book-Entry Executive Order’). 
58 Reputed ownership is the situation where the seller knew or ought to have known that the purchaser 
would sell on the assets. Danish: legitimationsekstinktion. 
59 See section 1.3.b below. 
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The conditional sale allows a purchaser to dispose of assets to a limited extent. The 
conditional sale under Danish law lacks the fundamental characteristic of a general 
right of disposal. The conditional sale is not therefore suitable as a basis for 
implementing the right of use in Danish law. 
 
 
b. The consignment sale 
 
The consignment sale60 is a form of sale in which a consignor – as with a conditional 
sale – retains title to assets sold to a consignee,61 but where the consignor grants the 
consignee a right to resell the assets. 
 
The consignment sale is therefore fundamentally different from the conditional sale in 
the sense that the purchaser is actually allowed to sell the assets to third parties. 
Further, contrary to the rules relating to conditional sales, the rules relating to 
consignment sales are not provided for under Danish statute.62
 
Since the consignment sale allows for a general right to resell the consignment goods, 
the interesting problem is whether proprietary substitution as envisaged by the 
Collateral Directive takes place when the consignee resells the consignment goods. 
 
It is a well-established principle under Danish law that when the consignee resells the 
consignment goods to third parties in accordance with the consignment agreement, 
the consignor’s proprietary interest in the goods is lost.63 Because the naturale negotii 
of the consignment sale is that the consignee has to sell the goods to third parties, the 
consignor – by definition – is aware that he can lose his property right at any time. 
The consignor will – in principle – only have a contractual claim against the 
consignee. However, note that Danish law in certain exceptional situations 
acknowledges that a seller may shift his proprietary interest in the asset to an interest 
in the debt of a third party due to the purchaser for replacement of the aforementioned 
assets.64 The starting point is, however, that in the event of the consignee’s 
insolvency, the consignor will only have an unsecured claim on the consignee’s 
estate. The decisive moment for the loss of the consignor’s proprietary right is when a 
contract is concluded with a third party concerning the purchase of the consignment 
goods.65
 
Consequently, and as opposed to the right of use envisaged under the Collateral 
Directive, no proprietary substitution takes place in a consignment sale. 
 
                                                 
60 Danish: konsignationssalg. 
61 In order for the consignor’s retention of title in the assets sold to be respected by the consignee’s 
creditors, certain requirements have to be fulfilled. See on these requirements Article 34 and 50 of the 
Danish Credit Agreements Act, Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 153 and Lynge 
Andersen & Werlauff (1995): Kreditretten, p. 128. 
62 The rules governing consignment sales are therefore first and foremost dependent on the 
consignment agreement entered into between the parties. By way of analogy compare statutory 
provisions in respect of related legal areas such as the conditional sale and the sale on commission. 
63 See Jan Kobbernagel: Forhandlerkonsignation (1949), p. 132. 
64 Danish term: surrogat. Such surrogat arises in the event of damage claims, insurance money or 
appropriation. See section 1.B below. 
65 See von Eyben & Moegelvang-Hansen: Kreditorforfoelgning (1998), p. 271f. 
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1.4 Regular and irregular usufruct 
 
A right of usufruct66 (‘brugsret’) under Danish law is characterised by the fact that 
the beneficiary of the right of usufruct – the usufructuary – has a general right to 
make normal commercial use of the property of the provider of the right of usufruct.67 
As a consequence hereof, the usufruct requires possession by the usufructuary of the 
object to which the right of usufruct relates.68 A right of usufruct can be regular or 
irregular. 
 
Under a regular usufruct arrangement, the usufructuary is under an obligation to 
redeliver the property in specie at the end of the usufruct period. Since the regular 
usufruct entails a redelivery in specie, the usufructuary will naturally not be able to 
dispose of the assets by way of sale.69 If the usufructuary disposes unlawfully of the 
assets, the provider of the usufruct under a regular usufruct arrangement would – in 
principle – be able to trace the assets in the hands of third parties and revendicate the 
assets.70 As a consequence, the regular usufruct arrangement under Danish law is by 
its very definition unfit to serve as a basis for implementing the right of use of the 
Collateral Directive. 
 
On the other hand, an irregular usufruct occurs when the usufructuary has the right to 
dispose of the encumbered assets and is under an obligation to deliver generic assets 
at the end of the usufruct-period. The irregular usufruct arrangement entails a transfer 
of ownership from the provider of the usufruct to the usufructuary. This follows 
automatically from the requirements put forward by the Danish principle of property 
law that assets subject to a right of usufruct must be specific and identifiable.71 If 
these requirements are not met, the provider of the usufruct will not be able to enforce 
its proprietary right against the usufructuary’s third parties. The prudent solution 
would consequently be to structure the irregular usufruct arrangement as a transfer of 
ownership. Further, the construction as an outright transfer implies that the 
usufructuary would be able to dispose of the assets by sale to a third party. The 
transfer of title mechanism in relation to the irregular usufruct is comparable to the 
right of disposal envisaged by the Collateral Directive. 
 
As a consequence, the provider of the usufruct will be deemed to have lost his 
property right when the contract between the provider of the usufruct and the 
usufructuary is concluded. The provider of the usufruct will not therefore be able to 
trace the assets. Note that the moment of loss of ownership rights is different from 
that under the Collateral Directive. Under the Collateral Directive, the collateral 
                                                 
66 The term ‘usufruct’ means the right of the usufructuary of enjoying a thing, title to which is vested in 
the provider of the usufruct, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility, and advantage which it 
may produce, provided this is without altering the substance of the thing. See Black’s Law Dictionary 
(5th ed., 1989), p. 1384. Danish term: Brugsrettigheder. 
67 See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 13 and Vinding Kruse: The Right of Property 
(1939), p. 138. 
68 See Vinding Kruse: The Right of Property (1939), p. 138 and perhaps also W.E. von Eyben: 
Formuerettigheder (1958), p. 19. 
69 See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 13 and 188ff. 
70 See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 13 and 188ff, which bases the revendication on an 
analogy to Danish Code Article 5-8-12 (lending) and Article 5-7-4 (pledges). 
71 See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 61ff, and Roerdam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 
68ff. 
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provider remains the owner of the securities until the collateral taker disposes of 
them. 
 
A subsequent question is whether an irregular usufruct also entails proprietary 
substitution as envisaged by the Collateral Directive. Since the usufructuary has given 
up all proprietary right to the usufruct assets, the usufructuary’s redelivery obligation 
under an irregular usufruct is merely a contractual claim. Consequently, no 
proprietary substitution takes place. The concept of irregular usufruct under Danish 
law does not therefore encompass the proprietary substitution which Article 5 of the 
CD advertises. If irregular usufruct were used as the basic template for 
implementation of Article 5 of the CD in Danish law, a statutory provision in relation 
to proprietary substitution would be required. 
 
 
1.5 Regular and irregular pledges 
 
The notion of a ‘regular’ pledge entails two things: the delivery of an asset as 
collateral by the pledgor and the redelivery of exactly the same asset in specie by the 
pledgee, at the end of the term of the pledge. During the term, the pledgor by 
definition remains the owner of the pledged assets. These characteristics of the 
regular pledge have two implications. First, the pledgor can trace the assets in the 
hands of third parties,72 and secondly, the pledgee by definition cannot dispose of the 
pledged asset by sale, except in the case of realisation after default.73
 
On the other hand, an ‘irregular’ pledge entails that the pledgee can return equivalent 
assets to the ones received rather than in specie. Such a construction would not be 
afforded protection in Danish courts if based on a regular pledge, because of the 
conflict with the requirements that assets be specific and identifiable. The irregular 
pledge structure can therefore assist in implementing a right of use entailing a general 
right of disposal. The irregular pledge – like the irregular usufruct – automatically 
implies an outright transfer with the obligation to redeliver equivalent assets. 
 
In the case of an irregular pledge, the pledgee is considered the absolute owner of the 
pledged assets. Accordingly, the pledgee can dispose of the pledged collateral as it 
deems fit. The transfer of ownership takes place at the moment the contract is 
concluded.74
 
Note that the pledgor can still rely contractually on the pledge agreement to reclaim 
equivalent assets. This claim is, however, purely contractual and is worth little in the 
event of the pledgee’s insolvency. The pledgor’s rights are then satisfied according to 
the pari passu principle. 
 
The question remaining is whether irregular pledge also encompasses the proprietary 
substitution which Article 5 of the CD requires. The answer to this question is 
                                                 
72 In order for the collateral provider to be protected against creditors and bona fide purchasers the 
pledged collateral must be identifiable and specific as required by the Danish Law on Mortgages. See 
Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 61ff, and Roerdam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 68ff. 
73 See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 187. 
74 See section 1.4 above and cf. the different approach in respect of the timing issue in Article 5(2) of 
the CD. 
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negative, as in the case of the irregular usufruct (see section 1.4 above). The 
implementation of the right of use based on the Danish irregular pledge would need a 
special statutory provision to implement the feature of proprietary substitution as 
contained in Article 5(3) of the Collateral Directive. 
 
 
1.6 Consent-based right of disposal 
 
The implementation of Article 5 of the CD will probably be based on the consent-
based right of disposal applying to securities held by a dealer in securities (vertical 
relationship).75 However, important proprietary issues relating to the consent-based 
formula will still have to be addressed. These issues – especially the issue of when the 
collateral provider’s loss of ownership rights occurs – are analysed in this section, 
whereas the content and further requirements of Article 3b of the Financial Business 
Act are dealt with below in section 2. 
 
Because dispositions regarding dematerialised securities and immobilised physical 
securities have to be registered with the CSD and the depository respectively, 
unauthorised disposals by a pledgee or a custodian cannot occur in principle.76 It 
follows from this that a collateral taker’s right of disposal depends on the collateral 
provider’s consent. 
 
However, if the collateral provider consents to the collateral taker’s right of disposal, 
the collateral provider impliedly also agrees to be left with a contractual claim against 
the collateral taker for the redelivery of equivalent assets. By consenting to this 
replaceability of his securities, the collateral provider essentially agrees to transfer his 
right of ownership to the collateral taker in exchange for a contractual redelivery 
claim.77 A collateral arrangement entailing a right of disposal is exactly like an 
irregular structure.78 It must therefore be concluded that a right of disposal based on 
the collateral provider’s consent means that the collateral provider transfers title to the 
collateralised securities to the collateral taker. 
 
On the assumption that the collateral provider gives his consent to disposal, the 
remaining question relates to the point in time when the collateral provider loses its 
proprietary interest. Two solutions are possible. 
 
The first solution is that, since the consent-based formula essentially means that the 
collateral provider gives up his proprietary interests in the securities in return for a 
contractual redelivery claim in respect of equivalent securities, the collateral provider 
loses his property rights when the collateral agreement is concluded. This result is in 
accordance with general Danish property law principles and is also the result of the 
irregular pledge and irregular usufruct structures. 
 
The second solution makes the time of transfer of title and the collateral provider’s 
loss of proprietary rights dependent on the collateral taker’s actual use of the 
securities. The collateral provider therefore loses its proprietary interest at a later 
                                                 
75 See Article 3b(2) of the Financial Business Act. 
76 See section 2 below. 
77 Cf. the discussions on the consignment sale, the irregular usufruct and irregular pledge. 
78 I.e. either an irregular usufruct or an irregular pledge. 
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moment in time where the collateral taker disposes of the securities for the benefit of 
a third party. This solution resembles the solution of the consignment sale and is also 
the solution envisaged by Article 5 of the CD. 
 
Both solutions have advantages. The first solution seems advantageous, because it is 
in line with general property law principles and therefore simple to understand. The 
granting of a right of use automatically means that the collateral provider loses its 
proprietary interest. The consequences of such a contract are foreseeable. From this 
point of view it is preferable. Under the other solution, the collateral provider remains 
the owner of the collateralised securities until the collateral taker decides to make use 
of its right of disposal. Extending the time of transfer of ownership means that the 
collateral provider is protected for a longer period of time, which is crucial in the 
event of the collateral taker’s insolvency. 
 
The Collateral Directive adopts the same view as the consignment sale (i.e. the 
second solution).79 This deviates from the normal principles of Danish law, i.e. that 
proprietary rights are transferred when the agreement transferring title is concluded.80 
The working group established by the Danish Ministry of Justice will therefore most 
likely opt for a solution whereby the collateral provider loses its ownership rights 
when the collateral taker uses the securities. 
 
 
B. Proprietary substitution under Danish law 
 
Proprietary substitution within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the CD means that 
securities transferred under a contractual obligation to deliver equivalent assets fall 
under the same proprietary relationship as the original assets, i.e. the owner of the 
original assets is deemed to have been the owner of the substituting equivalent assets 
from the moment the transaction was entered into. 
 
The issue of proprietary substitution raises the issue of voidable transactions, i.e. 
transactions that take place within a so-called ‘suspect period’ before a party’s 
insolvency. The rules relating to voidable transactions are contained in chapter 8 of 
the Danish Insolvency Act. In the event of an imminent insolvency of the collateral 
taker, if the collateral provided has been used by the collateral taker and subsequently 
re-credited to the collateral provider’s account during the ‘suspect period’, it may be 
more vulnerable under Danish insolvency law. The transaction may be invalidated, 
even though economically no new collateral has been provided. However, it is also a 
general principle under Danish law that transactions taking place in the normal course 
of business are not voidable. Therefore, provided that the collateral is provided in the 
normal course of business (and there is no intention to give the collateral provider a 
preferential position), a proprietary substitution will not be voidable under Danish 
law.81
 
                                                 
79 See section 1.3 above. 
80 See sections 1.4 and 1.5 above. 
81 Cf. the Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(4) of the CD. 
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Proprietary substitution as understood above is not a very common feature of Danish 
law. Danish law only allows for proprietary substitution in the case of perishable 
goods and in the case of replacement82 (see sections 1.7 and 1.8 below). 
 
 
1.7 Perishable goods 
 
The Danish Law on Mortgages allows a collateral taker to dispose of received 
collateral if the collateralised assets can be deemed ‘perishable’. In such an event, 
Danish law – as is the case under German law – grants the collateral provider an 
ownership right in respect of the replacement goods.83
 
It is, however, questionable whether the proprietary substitution that takes place in the 
case of perishable goods will fit the notion of proprietary substitution under Article 5 
of the Collateral Directive. This is so for two reasons. First, securities are not covered 
by the concept of perishable goods. Second, proprietary substitution is possible in the 
case of perishable goods in order to ensure that realisation can take place, and not to 
facilitate further trades. 
 
Consequently, the notion of perishable goods as understood under Danish law cannot 
satisfactorily explain the introduction into Danish law of the rule of proprietary 
substitution as envisaged under the Collateral Directive. 
 
 
1.8 Replacement 
 
Replacement (‘surrogater’) takes place when the pledged collateral is damaged and 
proceeds are received by, or are due to, the pledgor in order to substitute the original 
collateral.84
 
The starting point under Danish law is that replacement can only take place under 
special circumstances. It follows from general principles that proceeds received by, or 
due to, the pledgor in exchange for pledged property are not subject to the right of 
pledge. The reason for this relates to the requirement under the Danish Law on 
Mortgages to be able to specify and identify the pledged assets. 
 
However, an exception is made if the proceeds arise from an expropriation by the 
Danish state, insurance and claims for damages.85 Assets resulting from such a 
situation are subject to a security interest. Danish courts have been very reluctant to 
accept circumstances under which replacement can take place, other than exceptions 
in the event of expropriation, insurance and claims for damages. This means that 
substitution will not take place in other situations. A new right of pledge is needed in 
these cases. 
                                                 
82 Danish term: surrogater or erstatningsvaerdier. 
83 See W.E. von Eyben: Panterettigheder (1958), p. 301. 
84 See UfR 1994.101 V and Roerdam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 93 and 95, Knud Illum: Dansk 
Tingsret (1976), p. 95 and Hayton, Kortmann & Verhagen (eds.): Principles of European Trust Law 
(1999), p. 182. 
85 See Roerdam & Carstensen: Pant (1998), p. 93f and W.E. von Eyben: Panterettigheder (1958), p. 
89. 
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As a result, current Danish law does not cover the proprietary substitution rule 
envisaged by the Collateral Directive. A statutory provision is needed to implement 
this feature. 
 
 
1.9 Conclusion to the horizontal relationship 
 
The right of disposal as envisaged by the Collateral Directive entails two things: a 
right of disposal and proprietary substitution. 
 
In relation to the right of disposal, Danish law contains legal concepts which to a 
certain extent allow a person given possession of an asset, but who is not the legal 
owner of the asset, to dispose of that asset. These legal concepts are the realisation of 
a right of pledge, the right of re-pledge, the conditional and consignment sales, and 
the irregular rights of usufruct and pledge. The concept of a right of disposal is 
therefore not completely unfamiliar to Danish law. In addition, such a right of 
disposal is contained in Article 3b(2) of the Financial Business Act, which allows for 
a dealer in securities to dispose of its clients’ securities on a consensual basis. The 
question of how far a right of disposal can be taken under Danish law has been 
investigated. Do the legal concepts mentioned allow for a general right of disposal? 
Can such a right be constructed on the basis of a contractual consent? 
 
The analysis above clearly shows that a general right of disposal – a right that is also 
envisaged in Article 5 of the Collateral Directive – is not usually possible under 
Danish law. A collateral arrangement, under which a collateral provider retains 
ownership of the collateral but where the collateral taker is granted the same rights 
over the collateral – i.e. the rights of an owner – as the collateral provider, is currently 
not possible. Only if legal ownership is transferred to the collateral taker does he have 
a general right of disposal. 
 
Neither realisation nor the conditional sale covers a general right of the collateral 
taker to dispose of the collateralised assets. Realisation is restricted to default 
situations and subject to strict requirements. The conditional sale falls on the issue of 
the purchaser’s right of disposal, which under Danish law is restricted. These 
concepts cannot be used to implement the right of use in Danish law. 
 
Re-pledging is only interesting because the situation – a pledgee’s right to re-pledge – 
is similar to the situation envisaged by Article 5 of the CD. However, under Danish 
law, re-pledging does not by definition allow the pledgee to sell the pledged 
collateral. Re-pledging is therefore also not suitable for implementing the right of use 
in Danish law. 
 
The consignment sale, and the irregular usufruct and irregular pledge seem to come 
closest to the ‘right of disposal’ feature. Under the consignment sale, the irregular 
usufruct and the irregular pledge, the right of disposal is general and therefore covers 
a disposal by way of sale as envisaged by the Collateral Directive. The consignee’s 
sale is the whole purpose of the consignment arrangement. Under the irregular 
usufruct and pledge, the right of disposal is a result of the transfer of title from the 
provider of the right of usufruct to the usufructuary and from the pledgor to the 
pledgee. All three disposal structures therefore allow for a general right of disposal. 
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Since Article 5 of CD is closest to the situation arising under the irregular structures, 
because it is a collateral arrangement and not a sales situation, it must be concluded 
that the consignment sale is not the basis for implementing the right of disposal in 
Danish law. 
 
Whether the introduction of a right of disposal into Danish law is based and 
characterised as an irregular usufruct or an irregular pledge seems irrelevant. Both 
concepts essentially entail the same thing, i.e. the vesting of a limited right, which 
entails an outright transfer, because of the right of use and the obligation to redeliver 
equivalent assets. It seems most correct, because Article 5 CD relates to pledge 
structures, to characterise the security interest combined with a right of use as an 
irregular pledge under Danish law. It has also been shown that the consent-based 
formula – as envisaged in the Danish Financial Business Act – resembles the irregular 
structures and involves a transfer of title. 
 
A major difference between the Collateral Directive and the irregular structures 
concerns the timing of the collateral provider’s loss of title. The timing issue will – 
because the Collateral Directive stipulates as much – have to be implemented in 
Danish law so that the collateral provider loses his property right at the time the 
collateral taker disposes of the assets for the benefit of a third party. 
 
The question therefore remains whether the irregular pledge also entails proprietary 
substitution as under Article 5 of the Collateral Directive. As can be seen above in 
sections 1.3 – 1.5, neither the consignment sale, the irregular usufruct nor the 
irregular pledge entail proprietary substitution. This means that the proprietary rights 
to the transferred assets are lost. The consignor, the provider of the usufruct and the 
pledgor are left only with a contractual claim against the consignee, the usufructuary 
and pledgee respectively. Needless to say, such a claim is unsecured in the event of 
the insolvency of the consignee, usufructuary or pledgee. Proprietary substitution is 
possible only in limited circumstances, such as in the case of perishable goods, 
damages, insurance claims (see section 1.B). The feature of proprietary substitution 
envisaged by Article 5 of the CD cannot therefore be implemented in Danish law by 
referring to conventional legal structures. 
 
An analysis of the horizontal relationship therefore finds that Danish law covers the 
feature of a general right of disposal, albeit with difficulty, but does not cover 
proprietary substitution. The implementation of Article 5 of the Collateral Directive 
in Danish law will need statutory provision. 
 
 
2. The relationship between the custodian and its client 
 
Apart from certain special custody arrangements (e.g. a dealer in securities’ custody 
arrangement) the rules governing custodial relationships under Danish law are not 
codified. After an analysis of the non-statutory custody relationship (in section 2.1), 
the rules regarding securities custody arrangements will be discussed (in section 2.2). 
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2.1 Non-statutory custody relationships 
 
A depositor’s deposit of an asset with a custodian can be ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’. A 
regular custody arrangement comprises all those custody arrangements under which 
the custodian does not have a right to dispose of the deposited assets.86 A depositum 
irregulare, on the other hand, is a custody arrangement under which the custodian is 
entitled to dispose of the deposited assets for the benefit of third parties subject to the 
obligation to deliver equivalent assets at a later date. 
 
The principle behind a depositum regulare under Danish law is that if a deposit does 
not consist of exactly the same assets as originally deposited, then, although it is 
segregated, the deposit is not protected from the custodian’s creditors. The different 
regular deposit constructions available under Danish law are, inter alia, (1) an 
arrangement whereby the depositor remains the owner of the individual deposited 
assets (individual deposit), and similarly (2) an arrangement under which the deposit 
consists of assets belonging to different clients, but where the assets can be identified 
and specified individually (an ‘omnibus deposit’)87. Danish courts have also 
recognised (3) a depositum regulare, where assets are held on a fungible basis88. In 
the third situation, the depositor was thought to have given up his proprietary claim in 
respect of the individually specified deposited assets in exchange for a co-ownership 
right to them, which means that the custodian is under the obligation to deliver 
equivalent assets to the investor, if so requested.89 This should be contrasted with the 
position of the custodian in the event of an individual or omnibus deposit, where he is 
under an obligation to return the deposited assets in specie. 
 
Since a custodian’s right of disposal under Danish law would be incompatible with a 
regular deposit, a right of use must take its starting point in the creation of a 
depositum irregulare. A depositum irregulare combines a transfer of title to the 
depositor with an obligation to acquire and redeliver equivalent assets.90
 
 
2.2 Custody of securities 
 
The rules governing the custody of securities under Danish law depend on the nature 
of the custodian and on the nature of the securities. Danish securities custodians can 
be divided into (1) central securities depositories (‘CSD’)91, (2) dealers in securities 
                                                 
86 If the custodian under a depositum regulare disposes of the deposited assets in favour of a third party 
without the consent of the depositor, the depositor can trace the assets and revendicate them from (bona 
fide) third parties, provided that the assets are specific and identifiable. This is the starting point for 
goods and other movables. See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 187. 
87 An example hereof is the ‘samledepot’ of physical or dematerialised securities. See section 2.2.2 
below. 
88 See UfR 1949.691 O, UfR1927.21 H, UfR1928.216 H, UfR 1997.762. 
89 This was for example the case in UfR 1927.21 H and 1928.216 H where the Danish Supreme Court 
recognised a pledgor’s proprietary right to fungible shares against the pledgee’s insolvency estate, 
although the identity of individual shares could not be established. These two decisions allowed the 
pledgor to claim as many equivalent shares as originally pledged. 
90 See Elmer & Skovby: Ejendomsretten 1 (1995), p. 40f and Bernhard Gomard: Obligationsret 1 
(1989), p. 85f. 
91 The Danish CSD – Vaerdipapircentralen – administers dematerialised securities. 
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(typically a bank or an investment firm)92, and (3) persons – legal entities as well as 
physical persons – who are neither a CSD nor a dealer in securities and who hold 
physical (bearer) securities in custody for their clients93. 
 
Below it will be investigated if the Danish CSD Vaerdipapircentralen (‘VP’)94 and 
dealers in securities have a right of use in respect of the interests in securities of 
investors. 
 
 
2.2.1 Central securities depository 
 
The custody rules relating to the Danish CSD are contained in the Danish Securities 
Trading Act (‘STA’)95. The STA does not provide for a right of use of the VP in 
respect of securities it has in custody. Therefore the VP currently does not have a 
right of use in respect of investors’ assets.96
 
The custodial relationship between the VP and an investor keeping a securities 
account with the VP must be characterised as a regular deposit excluding a right of 
use. This is supported by Article 31 of the Book-Entry Executive Order97, which 
requires the VP to register securities belonging to a specific investor in an individual 
account98. Securities kept by the VP are considered to be the separate property of 
individual investors. This means that in the event of the VP’s insolvency, the 
investors’ securities will be exempt from the insolvency proceedings, provided that 
the ownership is duly evidenced in the records of the VP or in transcripts thereof. The 
VP’s redelivery obligation is therefore an obligation in specie. A right of use cannot 
be granted to the VP. 
 
 
2.2.2 Dealers in securities 
 
The rules governing the business of dealers in securities are contained partly in the 
STA and partly in the Financial Business Act (‘FBA’)99. Article 3b of the FBA 
                                                 
92 Dealers in securities hold immobilised physical securities and can hold dematerialised securities on a 
‘nominee’-basis for its clients (see below). 
93 An example of such a custody relationship is the holding of physical securities by attorneys on behalf 
of their clients. The non-statutory rules relating to regular/irregular deposits apply to securities holdings 
of this kind (see section 2.1 above). These securities holdings will not be analysed any further. 
94 The VP is currently the only central securities depository in Denmark and all securities kept in the 
VP are dematerialised. See Article 59 of the STA. 
95 See footnote 41 above. 
96 CSDs are not encompassed by Article 3b of the Danish Financial Business Act, because they are not 
dealers in securities within the meaning of Article 4 of the STA. Cf. Benjamin: The Law of Global 
Custody (2003), Ch. 7.52. 
97 See Executive Order 925 of 17/10/1996 concerning the Book-Entry etc. of Electronic Securities in a 
Central Securities Depository (‘Book-Entry Executive Order’). 
98 The account has to state (1) the name of the account controller, (2) the ISIN number and nominal 
value of the securities, (3) the name, address and ID-number of the investor, and (4) to whom the CSD 
should make payments. See Article 31 of the Book-Entry Executive Order. Note that the VP has over 
2.7 million accounts of owners of securities. 
99 See footnote 42 above. 
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contains the rules relating to a dealer in securities’ holding of securities for its 
clients.100
 
The term dealer in securities is defined in Article 4 of the STA. Dealers in securities 
are entities with the exclusive right of addressing the public on a professional basis, 
offering themselves as buyers and sellers of and intermediaries for securities.101 
Credit institutions, investment companies and mortgage credit institutes can be 
dealers in securities.102 In order to conduct business as a dealer in securities, an 
authorisation by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority is mandatory.103
 
According to Article 3b of the FBA, a client has a proprietary claim in respect of 
securities held by a dealer in securities in order to protect the client against the 
dealer’s insolvency. Securities held by a dealer in securities can be physical (bearer) 
securities or dematerialised book-entry securities (‘fondsaktiver’)104. Physical 
securities entail the opening of a physical deposit with the dealer where the securities 
are immobilised, while dematerialised securities require the opening of an account 
with the VP. It is submitted that the legal issues relating to physical deposits and to 
securities accounts opened with the VP are the same as far as the right of use is 
concerned.105 In the following, therefore, references to deposits should be understood 
as encompassing both types of deposits. 
 
A dealer in securities can maintain its clients’ securities in two ways – either in an 
individual deposit or in an omnibus customer deposit (‘samle depot’).106 These two 
kinds of deposits are treated in turn below. The conditions under which a dealer in 
securities can dispose of its clients’ assets will be investigated. 
 
 
2.2.2.1  Individual deposits 
 
An individual deposit is a separate and segregated deposit held with a dealer in 
securities or with the VP in the investor’s name.107 The individual deposit is therefore 
a depositum regulare in principle. The investor has a proprietary right to particular 
securities held on deposit.108 In principle, the dealer cannot therefore dispose of assets 
in its custody.109
                                                 
100 Note that major amendments have been made to the current FBA, but without substantial changes to 
the current Article 3b. The new FBA (Lov om finansiel virksomhed; see L 176 – Till A 4642) was 
enacted on 4 June 2003, and will enter into force on 1 January 2004. Article 3b of the FBA will 
become Article 72 of the new FBA. 
101 See Article 4(1) of the STA. 
102 The list of dealers in securities is exhaustive. See Article 4(3) of the STA. 
103 See Article 8 of the STA. 
104 Fondsaktiver are tradable book-entry securities registered with the VP. See Article 59 (1) and (2) of 
the STA. Cf. Kruger Andersen & Jul Clausen: Boersretten (2003), p. 131. 
105 Cf. Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen (2003): Internationale aspekter af insolvens- og tingsretten, p. 690. 
106 See Article 3b(3) of the FBA. 
107 Danish law requires Danish financial institutions to segregate their own assets from clients’ assets, 
whether these assets are held in custody in Denmark or abroad. See Article 3b(3)(2) of the FBA and 
Kruger Andersen & Jul Clausen: Boersretten (2003), p. 88f. 
108 In the event that dematerialised securities are registered by a dealer in securities in its capacity as an 
Account Controller and have been registered with the VP on an individual account in the name of the 
investor, they are exempt from any insolvency proceedings according to Article 82 of the Danish 
Insolvency Act. The ownership of the individual securities – in the event of the dealer in securities’ 
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An investor can grant the dealer a right of disposal in the case of an individual 
deposit. Granting a right of disposal to a dealer in securities must fulfil the 
requirement set out in Article 3b(2) of the FBA. Under this provision, a dealer in 
securities cannot dispose of securities in its custody without the investor’s consent. 
The investor’s consent must be explicit.110
 
Apart from the investor’s consent, the provision itself does not specify further details 
or requirements for the dealer in securities’ right of use. The preparatory works only 
state that the provision allows the dealer a right of use of the securities, for example 
on the basis of a securities lending arrangement, but do not describe further to what 
extent and under what conditions the dealer can use the securities in its custody. Also, 
the requirement set out in Article 3b(1)(1) of the FBA, which states that a dealer has 
to take measures in order to safeguard the proprietary claim of the investor, provide 
little guidance in this matter. 
 
If, however, an investor consents to a dealer’s right to disposal of securities in its 
custody, the investor impliedly also agrees to be left with a contractual claim against 
the dealer for redelivery of equivalent assets. By consenting to this replaceability of 
his securities, the investor therefore also agrees to transfer his right of ownership to 
the dealer in securities in exchange for a contractual redelivery claim.111 It must 
therefore be concluded that the custody should essentially be characterised as a 
depositum irregulare, and that consent to a right of disposal essentially entails a 
transfer of title. 
 
 
2.2.2.2  Omnibus accounts 
 
A ‘samle depot’ – according to Article 3b(3) of the FBA – is an omnibus customer 
deposit112, where an investor’s securities are held on deposit together with the 
securities of other investors.113 Dematerialised securities registered with the VP and 
part of a samle depot are held on a nominee basis. The nominee structure means that 
the investor appoints a nominee whose name, instead of the investor’s, appears in the 
VP System.114 The nominee de facto replaces the owner of securities to the outside 
                                                                                                                                            
insolvency – can be proven by way of precise account documentation received from the dealer. See 
Erik Werlauff: Boers- og Kapitalmarkedsret (2000), p. 112, and Kruger Andersen & Jul Clausen: 
Boersretten (2003), p. 88f. 
109 The person amending the securities register should be authorised to do so on the basis of the 
applicable account agreement (‘register legitimation’). See Article 36 of the Book-Entry Executive 
Order and Jul Clausen: Sikkerhed i fordringer (2002), p. 122. 
110 See the corresponding provision in the second indent of Article 10 of the Investment Services 
Directive (cf. footnotes 6 and 8 above) and Jul Clausen and Kruger Andersen: Boersretten (2003), p. 
88. 
111 Cf. the discussions supra on the irregular usufruct and irregular pledge. 
112 Or omnibus customer account, if the securities are dematerialised and kept with the VP. 
113 The dealer can only place an investor’s securities in a samle depot, if the custodian informs the 
investor of the legal effects of doing so and if the investor has consented. The dealer has to segregate 
its own securities holding from its clients’ securities. The Danish Financial Authority (Finanstilsynet) 
can, under special circumstances, allow a dealer in securities to place its own securities holding in a 
samle depot with the securities of other investors. See Article 3b(3) of the FBA. 
114 See Article 72(2) of the STA. 
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world.115 This means that the nominee is technically able – albeit not permitted116 – to 
dispose of the securities. The nominee can therefore pass on good title in respect of 
the securities to a bona fide purchaser. Physical securities are not held and registered 
by the VP. A samle depot consisting of physical securities is held and registered by 
individual Danish dealers in securities. 
 
In respect of physical (bearer) securities as well as dematerialised securities, Article 
3b(1)(1) of the FBA requires dealers to take satisfactory measures to safeguard the 
proprietary claim of investors. Dealers must keep a register, which clearly specifies 
the ownership rights of individual clients in respect of the securities registered in the 
omnibus account.117 The inventory makes it possible to determine exactly which and 
how many of the securities in the omnibus account are attributable to each investor. 
The investor therefore has a traceable and enforceable right in respect of individual 
securities in the event of the dealer’s insolvency.118 If the dealer fails to keep a record, 
and unless the investor is able to prove the identity of the securities by some other 
means, the investor is left with an unsecured claim and is therefore unable to enforce 
a proprietary claim if the dealer becomes insolvent.119
 
Because Article 3b(3) of the FBA requires dealers in securities to keep an inventory, 
the securities are held on a non-fungible basis and the dealer’s obligation to redeliver 
the securities is in specie. In principle, therefore, the samle depot is a depositum 
regulare.120
 
As with the individual deposit, the omnibus deposit does not allow the dealer in 
securities a right of disposal, unless the investor expressly consents to such.121 The 
investor in this case also impliedly agrees to the transfer of ownership of the 
securities in exchange for a contractual claim for redelivery of equivalent assets. 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion to the client-custodian relationship 
 
The Danish position on the right of a custodian to dispose of its clients’ securities is 
dependent on the custody relationship, i.e. on whether there is a securities holding 
with the Danish CSD, the Vaerdipapircentralen, (of dematerialised securities) or with 
a dealer in securities (of either dematerialised securities or immobilised physical 
securities). The Danish CSD currently has no right of disposal, while the securities in 
the custody of a dealer can made be available for the dealer’s own purposes. The right 
of the dealer in securities to use the securities in its custody is, however, dependent on 
                                                 
115 The nominee handles the investor’s economic interests. The nominee may, for example in the case 
of equities, receive dividends and other payments, along with shareholder information. Should the 
investor wish to grant the nominee administrative powers, this requires a separate contract between the 
parties. In the event of the nominee’s insolvency, the investor is in principle protected from the 
creditors of the nominee, because they do not have a better right to the securities than the nominee. The 
nominee is just a middleman, and the actual ownership right is with the investor. 
116 In principle, a disposal by the nominee is a breach of the contract between the nominee and the 
investor, and an infringement of the property interest of the investor, who is the actual owner. 
117 See Article 3b(3) of the FBA, and Jul Clausen & Kruger Andersen: Boersretten (2003), p. 89. 
118 See Article 3b(4) of the FBA and Jul Clausen & Kruger Andersen: Boersretten (2003), p. 90. 
119 See Erik Werlauff: Boers- og Kapitalmarkedsret (2000), p. 112. 
120 Cf. section 2.1 above. 
121 See Article 3b(2) of the FBA. 
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the client’s express consent. This follows from Article 3b(2) of the FBA, which 
implements Article 10 of the Financial Services Directive in Danish law. 
 
The custodian’s right of disposal on the basis of consent implies that the client gives 
up its proprietary claim in respect of the assets deposited individually or in a samle 
depot, in return for a contractual claim for redelivery of generic assets. Article 3b(2) 
of the FBA therefore entails an ‘irregular custody’ structure. Because the client has 
consented to disposals by the dealer in securities, he loses his ownership rights to the 
deposited securities. The client will, as a consequence, run an insolvency risk in 
relation to the custodian. 
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2. DUTCH AND GERMAN LAW∗
The right of use based on a security interest as envisaged in the Collateral Directive 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores whether a right of use based on a security interest is compatible 
with the Dutch and German systems of property law. In particular it is examined if 
the right of use set out in Article 5 of the European Collateral Directive (‘CD’)122 
should not actually be qualified as a transfer of ownership. Also it investigates 
whether the provision on proprietary substitution set out in the Collateral Directive 
can be reconciled with Dutch and German property law.123
 
General right of disposal 
On the basis of Article 5 of the CD a collateral provider can give a collateral taker a 
right of use. This right of use means that a pledgee has the right to dispose of the 
pledged assets in his own name. He can sell the assets to a third party or encumber 
them with a security interest. A pledge under Dutch and German law is a security 
right. Under current law, a pledgee only has a right to dispose of pledged assets if an 
event takes place that justifies enforcement of his security right. The right of use 
implies a pledgee’s general right of disposal and is therefore a remarkable 
development in security law. 
 
Proprietary substitution 
A second theme addressed in Article 5 of the CD is that of proprietary substitution.124 
Under Article 5 of the CD, if the collateral taker executes his right of use, a collateral 
provider is left with a contractual claim until the moment that the collateral taker 
transfers equivalent assets. These assets must be transferred at the latest at the end of 
the transaction. As soon as the collateral taker receives these equivalent assets, the 
Collateral Directive proposes proprietary substitution. This means that the collateral 
provider is the owner of the equivalent assets transferred, and is deemed to have been 
the owner as from the moment the original collateral was first provided. Under 
current Dutch and German law such proprietary substitution is only possible under 
very limited conditions. A fundamental change is also required in property law to deal 
with this issue. 
 
Current market practice 
At present, collateral market participants in Germany and in The Netherlands provide 
collateral by way of a transfer of ownership. Collateral in repurchase agreements is 
usually transferred on the basis of a sale/re-sale, whereas collateral in securities 
                                                 
∗ The author is grateful to Professor Leenen and colleagues at the Free University of Berlin for the 
research facilities provided and for the exchange of thoughts. Professor Flessner is thanked too, for the 
stimulating talks at the Humboldt University in Berlin. 
122 See footnote 4 above. 
123 For the current proposals for implementation, see: the Dutch draft Law on Financial Collateral 
Agreements, TK, 2002-2003, 28874, nr. 1-2 (proposed Article 7:53 of the Dutch Civil Code), and the 
Explanatory Comments (‘Memorie van Toelichting’) thereto (TK, 2002-2003, 28874, nr. 3); the 
Diskussionsentwurf des Bundesministerium der Justitz; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung der 
Insolvenzverordnung, des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches und anderer Gesetze, p. 18-19 (available on 
www.bmj.bund.de, search for ‘finanzsicherheiten’). 
124 Cf. section 2 of the introduction to this report. 
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lending is transferred on the basis of a loan of fungibles (‘verbruiklening’, 
‘Darlehen’). This practice is sanctioned in Article 6 of the CD concerning the 
recognition of title transfer arrangements. 
 
Outline 
The sections on ‘execution’, ‘re-pledge’, ‘proprietary representation’ and ‘perishable 
goods’ mainly focus on the circumstances under which a pledgor is – or is not – 
entitled to dispose of the pledged assets under current law. In the section on ‘usable 
goods’, the theory of irregular pledge, usufruct and custody is considered. The focus 
of the section on ‘proprietary substitution’ is on the limits of such substitution under 
current Dutch and German law. 
 
This chapter examines the right of use from a legal point of view. The question of the 
tax, regulatory and accounting treatment of a security interest combined with a right 
of use will not be examined. 
 
 
1. Execution 
 
The most important example of a pledgee being entitled to dispose of pledged assets 
in his own name is execution. Only if the obligation in relation to which the right of 
pledge is vested is not fulfilled, is the pledgee entitled to enforce his security interest. 
Note that the right of use under the Collateral Directive goes further, as it entails a 
right to dispose under ‘normal circumstances’. Because execution is not that wide in 
scope, it cannot serve as a basis for implementing the right of use. 
 
 
2. Re-pledge 
 
On the basis of Article 3:242 of the Dutch Civil Code, a pledgor can give a pledgee 
the right to establish a further right of pledge over the pledged asset for the benefit of 
a third party. This further right of pledge is established later, but ranks above the 
initially established right of pledge. In Dutch legal literature the device of re-pledge 
has been criticised. The argument is that a pledgee cannot dispose of assets that are 
not his own, and therefore should not be able to establish a further right of pledge for 
the benefit of a third party.125
 
This approach in Dutch legal literature is exactly the same approach as that taken by 
the drafters of the German Civil Code. Under German law, a pledgee cannot establish 
a right of pledge over the pledged asset for the benefit of a third party. He only has 
                                                 
125 See on the re-pledge generally: Asser-Serie 3-III (2003), nr. 38-39; M.A. Koopal, ‘De 
herverpanding van artikel 3:242 BW: Een Monstrum?’, WPNR 6202 (1995), p. 775-777, with reaction 
of C.M. Stokkermans, WPNR 6226 (1996), p. 418-419; H.A.G. Fikkers, ‘Herverpanding 
heroverwogen’, WPNR 6313 (1998), p. 301-307, with reaction of N.E.D. Faber, WPNR 6333 (1998), p. 
686-688; J.J. van Hees, ‘Gedachten over herverpanding’, in: J.C. van Apeldoorn, e.a. (ed.), Onzekere 
Zekerheid; Insolad Jaarboek 2001, Kluwer, Deventer, 2001, p. 227-238; K. Breken, ‘Herverpanding, 
geen standaard ‘nemo plus’ situatie’, in: S.C.J.J. Kortmann, e.a. (ed.), Onderneming en tien jaar nieuw 
burgerlijk recht, Kluwer, Deventer, 2002, Serie Onderneming en Recht (24), p. 365-387. And 
critically: W.J. Zwalve, ‘Enige opmerkingen over art. 3:242 BW’, in: T. Hartlief, e.a. (ed.), CJHB 
(Brunner-Bundel), Kluwer, Deventer, 1994, p. 441-450. 
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the right to pledge the right he has towards the original pledgor for which the original 
right of pledge was established.126
 
The right of re-pledge is envisaged in the Dutch Civil Code, but comes in for 
criticism. Under German law, such a right does not exist. In addition, a right of re-
pledge can never entail that a pledgee has a right to transfer ownership of pledged 
assets. The right of use under the Collateral Directive, on the contrary, does entail a 
right to pledge and to transfer. The right of re-pledge cannot therefore be a 
satisfactory explanation for the right of use. 
 
 
3. Proprietary representation 
 
The concept of proprietary representation (‘machtiging’, ‘Ermächtigung’) means that 
someone who is not the owner of an asset is given the right to dispose of the asset in 
his own name. Proprietary representation has not explicitly been codified in the Dutch 
Civil Code. In German law proprietary representation does have an explicit legal 
basis.127 Important applications of the doctrine of proprietary representation under 
both Dutch and German law are 1) the disposal by an agent in the case of a sale on 
commission (e.g. the Dutch ‘lastgeving’) and 2) the consignment sale and other 
retention of title arrangements (e.g. the Dutch ‘eigendomsvoorbehoud’ and the 
German ‘Eigentumsvorbehalt’).128
 
The sale on commission cannot serve as a basis for implementation of the right of use. 
In the case of a sale on commission, the agent in one way or another always 
represents the interest of the principal. In the case of the right of use, the only interest 
of the ‘pledgee’ is to obtain as much profit as possible for his own benefit. 
 
The right of use is probably more similar to a consignment sale. It is generally 
accepted by German legal scholars, and argued for by Dutch scholars, that the 
consignee should in the case of a consignment sale be able to dispose of assets in the 
normal course of business. It is argued that the consignee has this right of disposal on 
the basis of the concept of proprietary representation. However, the structure of a 
consignment sale differs from that of a security interest combined with a right of use: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 See for the approach of the so-called ‘Pandektisten’: H. Dernburg, Das Pfandrecht nach den 
Grundsatzen des heutigen römischen Rechts, Verlag von S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1860, part 1, § 61; 
Windscheid/Kipp, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechtes, Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1984, 2nd print of the 1906 
Frankfurt am Main edition, part 1, § 227. The German legislator has followed this approach: R. Johow, 
Die Vorentwürfe der Redaktoren zum BGB; Sachenrecht; Teil 2, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin – 
New York, 1982, p. 803-809 (in particular p. 804). 
127 See Article 185 of the German Civil Code. 
128 See Asser-Kortmann, Bijzondere overeenkomsten; Deel III, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1994, 
nr. 154 and nr. 168 et seq.; L. Groefsema, Bevoegd beschikken over andermans recht, diss. RUG, 1993; 
S.Y.T. Meijer, Middelijke Vertegenwoordiging, diss. VU, 1999, section 5.4; Pitlo-Reehuis, Het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht; Deel 3; Goederenrecht, Gouda Quint, Deventer, 2001, 11th edition, nr. 
141. 
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Security interest combined with a right of use 
 
  T=1; €    T=2; € 
  <--------------------  <-------------------- 
 A --------------------> B --------------------> C 
  T=1; security interest  T=2; execution of right of use 
  plus right of use 
 
  T=4; return of €  T=3; € 
-------------------->  --------------------> 
<--------------------  <-------------------- D 
  T=4; equivalent assets  T=3; buying equivalent assets in the market 
 
At T=1, A borrows euros from B and vests a security interest combined with a right 
of use in return. At T=2 B executes his right of use and sells A’s assets to C. Because 
of its obligation to transfer equivalent assets to A at T=4, B buys equivalent assets in 
the market from D at T=3. 
 
Consignment sale 
 
  T=1; consignment  T=2; sale of consigned assets 
 A --------------------> B --------------------> C 
  <--------------------  <-------------------- 
  T=3; payment   T=2; € 
 
At T=1, A gives B assets in consignment, which means that A retains title to the 
assets until B sells them in the normal course of business. At T=2, B sells the assets to 
C and receives euros in return. At T=3, B pays A for the assets. 
 
The structure of a security interest combined with a right of use is essentially different 
from that of a consignment sale. Without being exhaustive, a number of crucial 
differences are: 
 
1) In the right of use scenario, A already receives a counter-performance at T=1; 
in the consignment sale, A receives payment only at T=3; 
2) In the consignment sale, there is no obligation to deliver equivalent assets at 
the end of a transaction, but only an obligation to pay for the consigned assets; 
if a right of use has been granted, equivalent assets must be transferred; 
3) In the consignment sale, A is the secured party wishing to retain his ownership 
interest in any case until B has lawfully disposed of the assets in the ordinary 
course of business; in the right of use structure, both A and B are secured in 
the sense that their risk is covered by a counter-performance that is available 
for set-off129. 
 
The consignment sale deviates so much from the right of use structure under the 
Collateral Directive that it cannot be used as a basis for implementing the right of 
use.130 It will be shown below that the structure of a security interest combined with a 
right of use is essentially the same as that of an irregular pledge. 
                                                 
129 Such set-off is enforceable under the regime of the Collateral Directive. 
130 Also note that in the case of a consignment sale no proprietary substitution is possible under Dutch 
or German law. After a sale by the consignee the consignor is left with a contractual claim. 
 34
4. Perishable goods 
 
In the case of perishable goods, German law provides for a pledgee’s right to sell 
these goods, if necessary. After the sale, proprietary substitution takes place, i.e. the 
pledgor has an ownership right in respect of the replacement goods. Here you see 
both a right of disposal and a proprietary substitution arrangement in order to 
preserve the pledgor’s security right.131
 
The provision on perishable goods cannot help accommodate the right of use, 
however. This is so for two reasons. First, securities are not necessarily ‘perishable 
goods’. They can only be considered to be so in the case of extreme price fluctuations 
on the market. The right of use under the Collateral Directive aims at tradeability 
under all circumstances. The second argument relates to the two functions of 
collateral. Collateral in the sense of the Collateral Directive is provided for recovery 
purposes and for entering into further trades.132 The German arrangement in respect 
of perishable goods protects the pledgor’s security interest, and therefore only serves 
the recovery function of collateral. The right of use under the Collateral Directive, on 
the other hand, stresses the second function of collateral, i.e. trading with the pledged 
assets. For these reasons, the regulation on perishable goods cannot serve as a 
satisfactory basis for integrating the right of use in the Dutch and German systems of 
property law. 
 
 
5. Usable goods; Replaceability entails an outright transfer 
 
Usable goods are goods the main characteristic of which is that they can be consumed 
or sold. Securities are usable goods in the sense that one of their main features is that 
they are traded. How should a right of pledge, a right of usufruct or custody in respect 
of such usable goods be characterised? In Dutch and German doctrine, it is argued 
that in all these cases a transfer of ownership takes place, if the assets are made 
‘replaceable’. Replaceable means that the pledgee, usufructuary or custodian is 
allowed to dispose of the assets, while being under an obligation to transfer back 
equivalent assets. In this case the doctrine speaks of ‘irregular pledge’, ‘irregular 
usufruct’ and ‘irregular custody’ respectively.133,134
                                                 
131 The chapter on the right of pledge under the Dutch Civil Code contains no provision on perishable 
goods. Also in the literature on Article 3:229 of the Dutch Civil Code, which contains a rule of 
proprietary substitution, perishable goods do not feature. See section 6 below. 
132 See on the two functions of collateral section 2 of the introduction to this report. 
133 See on Dutch law: A. Hammerstein, Eigenlijke en oneigenlijke zaaksvervanging, diss. KUN, W.E.J. 
Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1977, chapter 4; Houwing, in: G. Van Hall, Ph.A.N. Houwing, Het afscheiden 
en individualiseren van vermogensbestanddelen ten behoeve van bepaalde crediteuren of groepen van 
crediteuren, Prae-advies Broederschap der Notarissen, 1952, p. 165-228; M.S. van Gaalen, 
Vruchtgebruik, Kluwer, Deventer, 2001, Ars Notariatus XCI, nrs. 022 and 153; W. Meijer, 
Effectenbewaring, diss. KUN, 1974, p. 3-27. See on the German irregular pledge: Staudinger, 
(Neubearbeitung 2002), § 1204, nr. 52-60. The irregular usufruct has been codified in § 1067 of the 
German Civil Code. 
134 Note that – contrary to doctrine – the Dutch legislator has recently enacted proprietary substitution 
in case of a right of usufruct. This choice, however, leads to dogmatic problems, particularly if 
substituting claims or immovable property are registered in the name of the usufructuary. It has 
therefore been argued in literature that the doctrine of irregular usufruct – entailing a transfer of 
ownership – should be re-established. See Van Galen (2001), in particular sections 5.4, 5.5, 5.8 and 
chapter 7 (section 175). 
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Taking into account that Article 5 of the CD relates to security interests, the focus of 
attention will be on the irregular pledge. The structure of an irregular pledge is 
essentially as follows. 
 
Irregular pledge 
 
  T=1; €    T=2; € 
  <--------------------  <-------------------- 
 A --------------------> B --------------------> C 
  T=1; irregular pledge  T=2; execution of right of disposal 
 
  T=4; return of €  T=3; € 
-------------------->  --------------------> 
<--------------------  <-------------------- D 
  T=4; equivalent assets  T=3; buying equivalent assets in the market 
 
This structure is exactly the same as the structure of a security interest combined with 
a right of use as envisaged in the Collateral Directive.135 Such a security interest 
combined with a right of use is therefore essentially an irregular pledge. In line with 
the doctrine on irregular pledge, usufruct and custody, the conclusion must therefore 
be drawn that the right of use under the Collateral Directive entails a transfer of 
ownership.136
 
Note that it is usually argued by Dutch legal scholars that the transfer of ownership 
takes place at the moment the parties intend to establish the irregular pledge, usufruct 
or custody arrangement.137 This is also the starting point in respect of the irregular 
pledge under German law.138 Also in the case of an irregular right of usufruct 
(codified in § 1067 of the German Civil Code), a transfer of ownership takes place at 
the moment the irregular usufruct is vested. The fact that you make assets replaceable 
automatically triggers a transfer of ownership.139
 
The Collateral Directive – in deviation from this theory – envisages that the collateral 
provider loses his ownership only at the moment that the collateral taker exercises his 
right of use.140 In this respect the Collateral Directive is – somewhat inconsistently – 
not in line with the theory on ‘irregular’ structures, but follows the principles relating 
                                                 
135 Cf. section 3 above. 
136 The irregular pledge has been suggested in German literature as a way of implementing Article 5 of 
the CD. See K. Löber, ‘Der Entwurf einer Richtlinie für Finanzsicherheiten’, Zeitschrift für Bank- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht (‘BKR’) 3/2001, p. 118-124; C. Keller, ‘Die Wertpapiersicherheit im 
Gemeinschaftsrecht’, BKR 8/2002, p. 347-354; K. Löber, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie über Finanzsicherheiten’, 
BKR 14/2002, p. 601-602; C. Keller, ‘Umsetzung der Richtlinie zu Finanzsicherheiten’, BKR 12/2003, 
p. 481-483. Cf. the discussion paper issued by the German Ministry of Justice, mentioned in footnote 
123 above. 
137 See in this sense Meijer 1974, p. 27 (section 4); Hammerstein 1977, chapter IV, § 2. Houwing 1952, 
p. 170-171, stresses the importance of the relationship between the parties. 
138 Staudinger, (Neubearbeitung 2002), § 1204, nr. 54 stresses the will of the parties as an important 
factor, but takes the moment the irregular arrangement is entered into as a starting point. 
139 A difference between the consignment sale and the irregular pledge therefore concerns the moment 
when the consignor or pledgor loses his ownership right (in the case of a consignment sale at the 
moment the assets are sold by the consignee, in the case of the irregular pledge at the moment the 
irregular pledge is established). 
140 Cf. Article 5(2) of the CD. 
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to the consignment sale. The consignor loses his ownership interest at the moment a 
lawful disposal is made by the consignee. 
 
 
6. Proprietary substitution 
 
Note that besides the introduction of the notion of dispositions by a secured party 
(which can only be accommodated in a satisfactory way by codifying the irregular 
pledge), the Collateral Directive also introduces a rule of proprietary substitution (see 
Article 5(3) of the CD). 
 
As was demonstrated in section 4 above, proprietary substitution can take place in the 
case of perishable goods. Assets that replace perishable goods are subject to exactly 
the same proprietary constellation as the original goods. Generally speaking, the 
concept of proprietary substitution is applied only in a very limited number of cases 
under Dutch and German law. Besides perishable goods, two other categories spring 
to mind: insurance money, or claims for damages that replace the original assets and 
are subject to the same proprietary constellation as the original assets.141 For example, 
a pledge on a car that is stolen can be transformed into a pledge on insurance money 
paid to replace the car. Note that the concept of proprietary substitution is limited to 
cases where the secured party’s security interest deserves protection, because there is 
an external factor affecting the value of the encumbered goods (perishable goods, 
insurance, damages). Under current Dutch or German proprietary law, proprietary 
substitution does not apply if the parties agree that the pledgee is allowed to dispose 
of assets in order to earn money. In the case of an agreement between the parties there 
is no external factor justifying application of proprietary substitution. Note in this 
respect that neither the consignment sale nor the irregular pledge know a rule of 
proprietary substitution. 
 
Article 5 of the Collateral Directive does, however, introduce a rule of proprietary 
substitution when a collateral taker starts trading with the encumbered assets. In order 
to accommodate the proprietary substitution rule of the Collateral Directive, the scope 
of application of the notion of proprietary substitution therefore needs widening 
considerably. This will inevitably lead to changes to Dutch and German law. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The pledge concept is incompatible with a pledgee’s general right of disposal. The 
pledge is a security interest, which means that dispositions can take place when there 
is an event of default. On the basis of the right of use under the Collateral Directive it 
is, however, possible to give the ‘pledgee’ a right to dispose under all circumstances. 
 
A pledgee’s general right of disposal is incompatible with a number of characteristics 
of a right of pledge. Under current law, a pledgor can redeem his assets at the moment 
                                                 
141 Article 3:229 of the Dutch Civil Code contains a rule on proprietary substitution. Basically, this 
substitution rule applies to damages or insurance money due or paid. See Parlementaire Geschiedenis; 
Boek 3, Vermogensrecht in het algemeen, p. 734-736; Asser-Serie 3-III (2003), in particular nrs. 25, 63, 
179. Cf. J.H. Nieuwenhuis, e.a. (ed.), Burgerlijk Wetboek; Tekst & Commentaar, Kluwer, Deventer, 
1998, commentary to Article 3:229 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
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he fulfils his obligations. Under current law, a pledgee has a duty of good care in 
respect of the pledged assets (which in any case means that he will not sell them to a 
third party) and is not allowed to appropriate assets. The right of use would render 
these principles void. A pledge is a security interest intended as a safeguard in an 
event of default, and not a general right of disposal. 
 
The theories of execution and re-pledge, and the concepts of the sale on commission 
and the consignment sale cannot serve as a basis for implementing the right of use 
into Dutch and German proprietary law. Also the German theory on perishable goods, 
which envisages both a right of disposal and a rule of proprietary substitution, cannot 
serve as a basis to implement the right of use. Securities are not perishable, but are 
usable goods. 
 
The theory of irregular pledge, irregular usufruct and irregular custody best illustrates 
what the right of use is all about. If assets are made replaceable, i.e. if the beneficiary 
has the right to dispose of them in exchange for a contractual obligation to redeliver 
equivalent assets, a transfer of ownership takes place. This transfer of ownership 
takes place at the moment the parties establish the irregular pledge, usufruct or 
custody arrangement. Note that Article 5 of the Collateral Directive envisages a 
transfer of ownership at the moment that the ‘pledgee’ exercises its right of use. At 
this point the Collateral Directive deviates from the theory on irregular structures.142
 
Everything points towards a transfer of ownership: the general right for the pledgee to 
dispose of the pledges assets, as well as the contractual obligation to deliver 
equivalent assets. If the pledgee does not fulfil his obligation, the pledgor has no 
proprietary action of revendication. The only remedy he has if the pledgee cannot 
fulfil his obligations is a right of set-off. Contractual arrangements regarding set-off 
are enforceable under the Collateral Directive. However, if the prices of the securities 
concerned go up, and in the absence of proper margin mechanisms, the pledgor is left 
with an unsecured contractual claim. He will in this case have to compete with other 
ordinary creditors on a pari passu basis. 
 
The proprietary substitution arrangement proposed in Article 5 of the Collateral 
Directive is also incompatible with current Dutch and German law. In the case of a 
consignment sale, no proprietary substitution takes place if assets are disposed of in 
the normal course of business. Also the doctrines of irregular pledge, irregular 
usufruct and irregular custody do not envisage proprietary substitution. Under current 
law, proprietary substitution is only possible in a limited number of cases (e.g. 
perishable goods, insurance, damages). 
 
The right of use is a deviation from the current practice in The Netherlands and 
Germany under which collateral is provided by way of a transfer of ownership. 
National legislators shall have to implement the right of use, a concept that is 
incompatible with pledge law and actually boils down to an outright transfer. The 
most elegant solution is to opt for the device of the irregular pledge, because it has 
‘pledge’ in its name but is actually a transfer of ownership. When implementing the 
                                                 
142 Van Setten suggests that the right of use of Article 5 of the CD should be implemented in Dutch law 
as a loan of fungible assets (‘verbruiklening’). Also such a loan entails a transfer of ownership, which 
takes place at the moment the loan is entered into. See J.H. Dalhuisen, L.D. van Setten, Zekerheid in 
roerende zaken en rechten, Kluwer, 2003, Preadvies van de Vereeniging ‘Handelsrecht’, p. 140-141. 
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irregular pledge, it should be taken into account that the Collateral Directive deviates 
from the approach in legal theory as far as the moment of the transfer of ownership is 
concerned. Besides, the Dutch and German legislators will need to accommodate the 
liberal rule of proprietary substitution set out in the Collateral Directive. 
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3. A CUSTODIAN’S RIGHT OF USE UNDER DUTCH LAW? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the right of use in a client – custodian relationship under 
Dutch law. First, the Dutch statutory system of custody of securities, the Securities 
Giro Transfer Act, will be dealt with. Second, the non-statutory system will be 
described briefly. Finally, the question will be addressed, whether a right of use, as 
envisaged in the Collateral Directive143, is compatible with the investor – custodian 
relationship in The Netherlands. 
 
 
1. The Securities Giro Transfer Act 
 
Like most other European jurisdictions, the proprietary aspects of custody of 
securities are regulated in a specific act, the Securities Giro Transfer Act (‘SGTA’ or 
the ‘Act’)144. The aims of the Act are twofold.145 The first is to provide a legal basis 
for the transfer of securities by way of book-entries. The second is to protect 
investors’ property rights. For this reason, the SGTA is based on the notion of co-
ownership. Two types of deposits must be distinguished: a collective deposit 
(‘verzameldepot’) and a giro deposit (‘girodepot’). Giro deposits are administered by 
Euroclear Netherlands146, the Dutch CSD. Collective deposits are administered by 
admitted institutions (‘aangesloten instellingen’).147 Investors hold an account with an 
admitted institution. All assets within a collective deposit are co-owned by the 
investors.148 An admitted institution holds an account with Euroclear Netherlands. As 
with the collective deposit, a giro deposit is subject to a right of co-ownership. 
Although the account with Euroclear Netherlands is registered in the name of the 
admitted institution, the co-ownership right forms part of the collective deposit.149 
The investors therefore have a right of co-ownership in a collective deposit, which 
includes, inter alia, a right of co-ownership in the relevant giro deposit. Assets held 
under the SGTA do not belong to the custodians. As a result, creditors of custodians 
have no recourse to these assets in the event of insolvency. Furthermore, investors are 
entitled to exercise such rights as the right to dispose, the right to vote, the right to 
income payments etc.150 Only in so far as this can be deemed necessary for the 
administration of the assets can a custodian exercise any investors’ rights vis-à-vis 
third parties.151
 
                                                 
143 See footnote 4 above. 
144 The Wet giraal effectenverkeer was enacted on 8th of June 1977, published in Staatsblad 1977, 333. 
The latest revision took place on 2 November 2000, published in Staatsblad 2000, 485. 
145 Kamerstukken II, 1975/76, 13780, nrs. 1-4, p. 1, 13 and 16-19. 
146 Euroclear Netherlands is the trade name of Nederlands Centraal Instituut voor Giraal 
Effectenverkeer BV (Necigef). 
147 An admitted institution is admitted as such by Euroclear Netherlands. 
148 See Articles 10 and 12(1) of the SGTA. An admitted institution can of course be one of the co-
owners. 
149 See Articles 38(1) and 10(c) of the SGTA. 
150 Kamerstukken II, 1975/76, 13780, nrs. 1-4, p. 18. 
151 See Articles 11 and 36 of the SGTA. Note that a custodian is explicitly excluded from exercising the 
right to vote. 
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2. Non-statutory custody of securities 
 
The SGTA is not applicable to all types of securities. Most notably, non-Dutch 
securities generally fall outside the scope of the SGTA. Where such securities are 
held by a custodian on a fungible basis – which is most often the case –, the custodian 
becomes their owner.152 As such, the custodian is in principle free to dispose of the 
securities as he deems fit. However, the custody contract usually provides that the 
custodian shall not dispose of the securities nor use any rights derived from the 
securities other than for the investors’ benefit and on their instructions. In contrast to 
the position under the SGTA, investors’ rights are not based on the rules of property, 
but on a contractual claim against the custodian. In the event of the custodian’s 
defaulting, investors cannot exercise any proprietary claims against the custodian, its 
trustees in bankruptcy or third parties. 
 
Where securities are not held on a fungible but on an individual basis, the investor has 
a property right. A custodian’s right of use must be based on a transfer of property, or 
be granted via a right of re-pledge, for example. 
 
 
3. A right of use? 
 
It inevitably follows from the foregoing that a custodian does not have a right to use 
investors’ assets for his own business purposes. This is one of the specific aims of the 
SGTA. Other than by means of a transfer, the only way a custodian can obtain 
specific rights over the investor’s right is if the investor grants them to it, for example 
through a right of re-pledge or a proxy to use the right to vote. In this context the 
question arises whether a general right of use granted through a security interest, such 
as envisaged in the Collateral Directive, is compatible with the nature of the legal 
relationship between a custodian and its client? Indeed it should be stressed that the 
relationship between a custodian and an investor is a fiduciary relationship, yet in the 
author’s opinion this does not necessarily render a right of use incompatible with this 
relationship per se. The fiduciary nature of the relationship means that the custodian 
should always act in the best interest of its clients. Furthermore, a custodian must 
provide its clients with such information as information they require.153 Whenever an 
investor pledges assets to his custodian, he does not expect to lose his rights to them 
as a result of a right of use. It is therefore submitted that a right of use contained in 
general terms and conditions154, or comparable standard agreements, is contrary to the 
fiduciary nature of the investor – custodian relationship. This does not mean, 
however, that a right of use as such is inherently incompatible with the investor – 
custodian relationship. It merely means that a custodian, when stipulating a right of 
use, should ensure, first, that the investor fully realises the legal implications of a 
right of use and, second, that the investor has given his full consent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152 Hoge Raad 12th January 1986, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1986, 274 (Teixeira de Mattos). 
153 See Article 2 of the General Banking Terms and Conditions (‘Algemene Bankvoorwaarden’). 
154 For instance the General Banking Terms and Conditions. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Dutch SGTA makes it very clear that a custodian does not have a right of use 
with regard to investors’ assets. In fact it is one of the goals of the Act. The only way 
for a custodian to obtain a right of use is through a transfer of ownership or being 
granted such a right by an investor, such as for example a right of re-pledge or a 
proxy to vote. Where securities become property of the custodian by virtue of a 
custody agreement, the custody agreement grants the investors use of the securities. A 
general right of use as envisaged by the Collateral Directive is not necessarily 
contrary to the fiduciary nature of the custodian – investor relationship, provided the 
investor fully realises the legal consequences of such a right and has given his full 
consent to it. 
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4. THE IRREGULAR PLEDGE UNDER ITALIAN LAW 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the irregular pledge under Italian law and focuses in particular 
on the following issues: 
 
1) The legal status of a security interest combined with a right of disposal; 
2) Whether a pledge can qualify as ‘irregular’ with respect to securities held on 
an individual basis, as well as to securities held with a depository on a non-
dematerialised or dematerialised basis; and 
3) If and under what conditions a depository and a financial intermediary can 
dispose of investors’ assets. 
 
 
1. Definition of irregular pledge 
 
Articles 2784 ff. of the Italian Civil Code govern pledges. These articles contain no 
specific provision concerning the irregular pledge. However, Article 1851 of the 
Italian Civil Code, concerning ‘anticipazione bancaria’ contracts (i.e. bank advances 
secured by deposits in money, chattels or securities), expressly refers to the irregular 
pledge. According to this provision, if monies, chattels or securities – which are not 
identified – are deposited as a guarantee for one or more bank advances, or if the 
bank has been granted a special power of use thereof, the pledge qualifies as irregular. 
In this case the bank, in its capacity as secured creditor, is only obliged to return the 
sum, chattels or securities exceeding the amount of the secured claims to the pledgor. 
 
The meaning and the scope of the irregular pledge have been outlined in more general 
terms by scholars and by the Italian courts. Indeed, irregular pledges can also be used 
to secure claims other than those deriving from the bank advances mentioned above, 
and also with respect to claims towards non-banking institutions. A pledge qualifies 
as ‘irregular’ provided that a) the pledge concerns monies, chattels or securities, and 
b) the parties consider that such assets belong to a genus. In this case, the pledgee can 
dispose of the pledged collateral and is only obliged to return the ‘tantundem eiusdem 
generis et quantitatis’ (same amount of the same kind and quantity) to the pledgor. 
On the contrary, a pledge is ‘regular’ if the assets pledged have to be returned in 
specie (e.g. a pledge is created over cash, but the individual notes pledged are 
identified by their serial number). 
 
 
2. Transfer of ownership 
 
The creation of an irregular pledge essentially entails a transfer of ownership for 
security purposes (trasferimento della proprietà a scopo di garanzia).155 The transfer 
of ownership occurs as soon as the pledged assets are delivered to the pledgee. 
Thereafter, the pledgor loses his rights to dispose of the pledged assets and only has 
                                                 
155 Gorla/Zanelli, Commentario del Codice Civile, Scialoja/Branca, Pegno Ipoteca, Zanichelli, 1992, 
Art. 2784, 37; Corte di Cassazione, 13.04.1977, No. 1380, Banca, borsa, titoli di credito, 1978, II, 421; 
Corte di Cassazione 25.11.1977, No. 5136, Banca, borsa, titoli di credito, 1978, II, 429. 
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the right to obtain restitution of the tantumdem eiusdem generis et quantitatis as soon 
as the secured obligations have been paid. 
 
 
3. Pledgee’s right of disposal: security interest or outright transfer? 
 
As seen above under section 2), it is generally held that the creation of an irregular 
pledge entails an outright transfer and not a mere security interest with a right of use. 
Accordingly, the pledgee may dispose of the pledged assets in his own interest and 
for his own benefit, i.e. he has no fiduciary duties with respect to the pledgor. The 
pledgee is only bound to return to the pledgor the tantumdem eiusdem generis in full 
or in part when the debt is settled either fully or partially, as the case may be. 
 
Italian scholars consider that where an irregular pledge over money is created, the 
transfer of money to the secured creditor amounts to an anticipatory satisfaction of 
the secured claim.156 This conclusion does not, however, alter the principle expressed 
above whereby the pledgee is only bound to return to the pledgor the tantumdem 
eiusdem generis. On the contrary, it accords with the idea that the creation of an 
irregular pledge entails an outright transfer. 
 
Moreover, the pledgor may exercise all rights pertaining to the pledged assets (e.g. 
option rights, distribution of profits and interests). 
 
 
4. Pledgor’s rights 
 
According to the aforementioned principles, it appears that the irregular pledge 
operates differently from the regular one. The irregular pledge does not serve to 
guarantee the success of enforcement proceedings, since the transfer of ownership 
satisfies the creditor’s interests directly. This is particularly true because the creation 
of an irregular pledge amounts to an anticipatory satisfaction of the creditor’s claim. 
 
In the case of an irregular pledge, if the pledgee becomes insolvent the pledgor may 
not exercise any action of revendication, since the ownership of the collateral has 
already been transferred to the pledgee on creation of the pledge. As mentioned 
above, the pledgor’s debt vis-à-vis the pledgee is considered extinguished, in full or 
in part, when the pledged collateral is delivered to the pledgee. On insolvency of the 
pledgee, therefore, the pledgor is exempted from paying his debt to the insolvency up 
to an amount corresponding to the pledged collateral. If the pledgor pays his debt vis-
à-vis the insolvent pledgee in full or in part, since he is barred from revendicating the 
pledged collateral, his claim will be satisfied according to the pari passu principle, 
i.e. the pledgor will have to file a claim with the Insolvency Court for restitution of an 
amount of money equal to the value of the pledged collateral.157
 
 
                                                 
156 E.g. a cautionary deposit of 10 guarantees a claim of 30; on creation of such deposit with the 
creditor, the latter definitively acquires the said sum which shall be deducted from the total credit 
leaving the creditor with an outstanding claim for 20. 
157 Gorla/Zanelli, cit., Art. 2784, 40. 
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5. Irregular pledge over securities158
 
Under Italian law the level of (de-)materialisation of securities is an important factor 
in determining whether the irregular pledge concept can be applied or not. 
 
Securities held on an individual basis 
In principle, the rules concerning the irregular pledge also apply to securities in as far 
as they qualify as ‘replaceable’ securities. However, a distinction should be made 
between bearer securities (‘titoli al portatore’), order securities (‘titoli all’ordine’) 
and registered securities (‘titoli nominativi’). In order to create a valid pledge over all 
the abovementioned types of securities, it is necessary, inter alia, to grant the secured 
creditor/s (or a third party appointed as custodian) a right of possession over the 
pledged securities. In addition, if such securities qualify as order or registered ones, it 
is necessary to execute a registration entry on the order securities’ certificates. If the 
securities are registered ones, it is necessary to execute double registration entries on 
both the registered securities’ certificates and on the relevant registers held by the 
issuer. These formalities might imply the specific identification of the securities and, 
consequently, the pledge thereby created would not qualify as ‘irregular’. However, 
in a case159 concerning order securities, an obiter dictum of the Italian Supreme Court 
stated that, notwithstanding the identification of the pledged collateral, the relevant 
pledge qualifies as irregular if the right of disposal of the pledged collateral is granted 
to the secured creditor. 
 
Securities admitted to a central securities depository system 
A further relevant issue is whether securities are held by a central securities 
depository on a non-dematerialised or on a dematerialised basis. The creation of 
central depository systems160 and the dematerialisation of securities lead to the 
introduction of specific technical rules161 relating to the admission, dematerialisation 
and creation of charges over such securities. In particular, the relevant question is 
whether intermediaries’ registration obligations in relation to such pledged securities 
identify the securities in re, so as to substantially preclude the existence of an 
irregular pledge. It could be argued that in the case of dematerialised securities and/or 
non-dematerialised securities admitted to the central securities depository system it is 
impossible, in any case, to qualify the pledge created over them as ‘irregular’. 
Although this position seems to be indirectly held by different scholars162 on the basis 
of several assumptions, their conclusions are neither fully substantiated nor do they 
seem to take into consideration all possible eventualities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 In the present work the term ‘securities’ refers to the Italian law notions of ‘titoli di credito’ 
(documents of credits) and ‘strumenti finanziari’ (financial instruments). 
159 Corte di Cassazione, 25.11.77, No. 5136. 
160 In Italy this function is currently exercised by Monte Titoli S.p.A. 
161 Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 1998; Legislative Decree No. 213 of June 1998; Consob 
Regulation No. 11768 of 23 December 1998. 
162 Ferrarini/Giudici, Le garanzie su strumenti finanziari nel diritto comunitario: orientamenti e 
prospettive, Il Fallimento, 9/2002, 1002. Sonia Carmignani, La gestione accentrata di strumenti 
finanziari, in Intermediari finanziari mercati e società quotate, a cura di A. P. Griffi, M. Sandulli, V. 
Santoro. E. Gabrielli, Il pegno anomalo, 1990, p. 185. 
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Non-dematerialised securities 
In a decision concerning State bonds163, the Turin Court recognised the possibility of 
creating an irregular pledge over non-dematerialised securities admitted to a central 
depository system. 
 
Dematerialised securities 
Italian scholars seem to exclude the possibility of a pledge over dematerialised 
securities (i.e. securities listed on Italian regulated markets) qualifying as irregular for 
the following reasons: no certificate is issued with respect to dematerialised 
securities; their circulation as well as the creation of charges over them occur through 
ad hoc registration entries in the accounts held with the financial intermediaries with 
which the securities are registered. On the basis of this assumption, scholars tend to 
categorise a pledge over dematerialised securities as a pledge over the receivables 
owed to the pledgor by the financial intermediary. An irregular pledge may be created 
over money, securities and chattels, but not over receivables. The irregular pledge 
concept is therefore not viable if receivables are the object of the pledge. 
 
 
6. Irregular deposits and dispositions by a financial intermediary 
 
Irregular deposit 
In the case of an irregular deposit, a transfer of ownership occurs from the depositor 
to the depository. Here the depository acquires the right to dispose of the 
securities/moneys. The depositor only has a contractual claim on the depository for 
the restitution of equivalent securities/moneys (tantundem eiusdem generis et 
quantitatis). 
 
With respect to an irregular deposit it is the subject of discussion whether a depositor 
can create an irregular pledge for the benefit of a third party. Italian scholars164 argue 
that such a pledge should be qualified as a pledge over receivables rather than an 
irregular one. The issue is disputed.165
 
Dispositions by financial intermediaries 
If there is no irregular deposit, financial intermediaries can also dispose of their 
clients’ securities subject to certain conditions. In the case of financial instruments, 
and pursuant to the regulation issued by the Bank of Italy’s Governor on 1st July 
1998,166 financial intermediaries (i.e. banks, investment undertakings and other 
entities indicated therein) may not dispose of clients’ financial instruments, unless 
they have first obtained their clients’ written consent. In order to obtain such consent, 
the financial intermediaries must enter into a specific agreement with their clients. 
Such agreements must specify, inter alia, the transaction authorised, the 
counterparty/ies and the guarantees offered. Furthermore, each transaction must be 
communicated to the clients. 
 
 
                                                 
163 Tribunale di Torino (Turin Court), 31.03.1992, BBTC, 1993, II, 336. 
164 Luminoso, Deposito cauzionale presso il terzo e depositi irregolari a scopo di garanzia, in Giur. 
Comm., 1981, I, 425. Gorla/Zanelli, cit., Art. 2784, 44. 
165 Please refer to the remark on receivables in the preceding section. 
166 Implementing the Investment Services Directive (see footnotes 6 and 8 above). 
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Conclusions 
 
Under Italian law if a pledge qualifies as irregular, the pledgee only has a contractual 
obligation to return to the pledgor equivalent assets (tantundem eiusdem generis et 
quantitatis) and also has the right to dispose of the pledged assets. An irregular 
pledge entails a transfer of ownership. 
 
An irregular pledge could be considered as an existing instrument implementing the 
right of use under Article 5 of the European Collateral Directive167. However, some 
Italian scholars seem to rule this possibility out in the belief that the irregular pledge 
concept is not applicable to dematerialised securities.168 Notwithstanding this contrary 
opinion, if the Italian legislator chooses the irregular pledge as the instrument to 
implement the requirements of the Collateral Directive, it might still be necessary to 
amend the regulatory provisions in force169 establishing the procedures and 
formalities to follow in order to create security interests over dematerialised 
securities. 
 
If, on the contrary, the irregular pledge principles are held to be incompatible with the 
current Italian law on dematerialisation, a more extensive modification of the existing 
law170 could be required to implement the Collateral Directive. 
 
As far as dematerialised securities are concerned, the so-called ‘riporto’ could be an 
alternative instrument for implementing the Collateral Directive. A riporto is a 
contract under which one party transfers to another the ownership of a certain type of 
securities for a specified price while the other party assumes the duty of transferring 
to the former the ownership of an equal number of securities of the same type at the 
expiration of an established term in return for reimbursement of the price. 
                                                 
167 See footnote 4 above. 
168 In a recent Communication (Communication No. DME/3046592 of July 14, 2003, addressed to the 
Italian Banking Association), Consob (the Italian Regulatory Authority for the securities market) 
clarified certain technical issues as to the formalities to be complied with in order to create an irregular 
pledge over dematerialised securities; however, Consob refused to clarify whether from a civil law 
perspective an irregular pledge over dematerialised securities is admissible, as this would have been 
outside the scope of its powers. 
169 Consob Regulation No. 11768 of 23 December 1998. 
170 Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 1998; Legislative Decree No. 213 of June 1998. 
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5. RIGHT OF USE UNDER ENGLISH LAW∗
 
 
Introduction 
 
The English law analysis adds value for two reasons. First, it shows that it is not 
necessarily the case in common law jurisdictions that a collateral taker can be granted 
a right of disposal on the basis of a security interest. Under American law, the 
beneficiary of a security interest can be granted a general right of disposal in certain 
financial (notably derivatives) transactions.171 However, granting a general right of 
disposal to such a beneficiary is alien to English law.172 Second, the reason for 
prohibiting a right of disposal on the basis of a security interest is slightly different 
from that given under Dutch and German law, for example. Whereas Dutch and 
German lawyers would emphasize that a security interest implies an obligation to 
exercise ‘due care’ in respect of the encumbered asset and, in particular, a prohibition 
on its appropriation, an English lawyer would probably focus on the equity of 
redemption as an inherent characteristic of security interests. Of course this is merely 
a matter of different focus, as these three approaches of security interests are 
essentially fully compatible and all of them exclude dispositions by the secured party. 
 
 
1. The client – custodian relationship 
 
Traditionally the relationship between client and custodian has been characterised as 
a bailment. There are good grounds for arguing, however, that this relationship should 
be characterised as a trust. This is based on the view that a bailment relates to tangible 
goods, whereas the indirect securities holding system relates to intangible goods. A 
trust is therefore a better way to characterise the relationship between client and 
custodian under English law. The custodian is the trustee and therefore the legal 
owner of the assets. The client is the beneficiary of the trust, and has a beneficial 
interest in the trust property.173
 
In England a custodian holds assets for clients on a segregated basis, i.e. on an 
account separate from the account on which its own assets are held. This ensures that 
the assets held on the client account are inaccessible to the custodian’s general 
creditors in the event of its insolvency. Clients’ assets are usually held on a 
commingled basis.174
 
                                                 
∗ The author is grateful to Dr. Joanna Benjamin for her critical comments in respect of this chapter. 
171 Note that the ISDA Margin Provisions (New York law) leave no room for any proprietary claim of 
the collateral provider whatsoever. It is therefore arguable that the structure envisaged in these Margin 
Provisions actually entails an outright transfer. Cf. section 3 of the introduction to this report. 
172 Benjamin uses the term ‘re-hypothecation’ to indicate this general right of disposal (i.e. the right to 
vest a security interest in respect of an asset or to transfer it outright). Because ‘re-hypothecation’ or 
‘re-pledge’ may be understood to relate to a right to vest a security interest only, these terms are not 
used in this chapter to refer to a general right of disposal. Cf. Benjamin (2000), cit. (footnote 29), 
chapter 5.C. 
173 See Benjamin (2000), chapter 2; A.O. Austen-Peters, Custody of Investments: Law and Practice, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, 2.25-2.32. 
174 See Benjamin (2000), section 2.73-74. 
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Starting point: the beneficiary’s interest 
A custodian cannot dispose of its clients’ assets in the course of its own business, 
because it acts in the capacity of a trustee. It would be incompatible with its fiduciary 
duty towards the client/beneficiary for a custodian to dispose of its clients’ assets and 
to pocket the profits. Any dispositions should be for the benefit of the clients.175
 
A third party purchaser may face actions by clients if a custodian disposes of clients’ 
assets wrongfully. If, broadly speaking, the purchaser knew or should have known 
that a disposition was illegal, he may face the prospect of tracing and/or constructive 
trusteeship.176 Such actions are, however, an exception in the securities markets, 
because a heavy duty to investigate does not benefit the smooth functioning of these 
markets.177
 
Basis for a right of disposal: outright transfer, not a security interest 
Of course a client is free to transfer his beneficial interest in book-entry securities to 
its custodian outright.178 In this case all rights (i.e. legal interest and beneficial 
interest) lie with the custodian who can then dispose of them freely. Under English 
law, however, a client cannot grant a custodian a general right of disposal on the basis 
of a security interest (i.e. for example a right to encumber the client’s interest in 
securities with a security interest or to transfer it outright to a third party). Such a 
right of disposal is incompatible with the key features of a security interest, such as 
the right of redemption.179 A general right of disposal is only compatible with the 
characteristics of an outright transfer, and a security interest comprising such a right 
should be re-characterised as an outright transfer.180
 
Market practice 
It is current practice that custodians reserve a right of use as a matter of routine. They 
often do so on the basis of securities lending agreements. Note that securities lending 
agreements are usually structured as an outright transfer.181 An outright transfer as a 
matter of fact entails a general right of disposal. 
 
Prime brokerage 
Prime brokerage is a bundle of services offered by financial institutions (including 
custodians) to their hedge funds clients. A prime broker often has the right to transfer 
securities out of its client’s custody account into its own account, subject to an 
obligation to deliver equivalent assets to the client. This enables the prime broker to 
dispose of its clients’ assets. This ‘right of use’ (i.e. the prime broker’s right to sell or 
encumber its clients’ assets) is in many cases based on a security interest.182 Under 
                                                 
175 Of course the custodian-trustee may ask for a reasonable fee for its services. See J.E. Martin, 
Hanbury and Martin; Modern Equity, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., London, 2001, 16th edition, p. 601-606. 
176 Cf. Benjamin (2000), section 2.52-65. 
177 Cf. on this policy issue Benjamin (2000), sections 2.52-65; and the UCC (2002 edition), cit. 
(footnote 14), p. 767-769. Cf. footnote 38 above. 
178 As the trustee is the legal owner, the only thing a beneficiary/investor can dispose of is his equitable 
interest. 
179 See Benjamin (2000), section 5.46-70. 
180 Cf. Benjamin (2000), p. 117 (footnote 101). 
181 The 2000 Global Master Securities Lending Agreement, but also for example the earlier 1995 
Overseas Securities Lender’s Agreement, are based on the outright transfer technique. 
182 It is believed that this is largely because prime brokers have modelled their documentation on US 
documentation. US law permits a right of use (cf. section 3 of the introduction to this report). 
 49
English law this construction runs the risk to be characterised as an outright transfer. 
Because of this, the prime brokerage documentation itself regularly envisages a 
conversion of the security interest into an outright transfer arrangement at the moment 
of actual use.183 This conversion reflects the fact that a general right of disposal is 
incompatible with the concept of a security interest (and with the notion of equity of 
redemption in particular).184
 
Conclusion 
Both legal theory and market practice lead to the conclusion that the only way under 
current English law to give a custodian the right to dispose of a client’s assets for its 
own business purposes is for the client to transfer its beneficial interest to the 
custodian outright. 
 
 
2. The collateral provider – collateral taker relationship 
 
What applies to the client-custodian relationship also holds good for the relationship 
between a collateral provider and collateral taker generally (i.e. even if they are not 
engaged in a trust relationship). A collateral provider can only grant a collateral taker 
a right to dispose of his assets by way of an outright transfer of his own interest in 
securities (whether it be a legal interest in non-dematerialised securities or a 
beneficial interest in securities held by an intermediary). As stated above, a right of 
disposal cannot be granted on the basis of a security interest under current English 
law. 
 
ISDA Margin Provisions 
It should be noted that the 2002 ISDA Margin Provisions also only envisage an 
outright transfer of collateral under English law. A right of use and a security interest 
are mutually exclusive concepts.185
 
 
3. Arguments for change? 
 
Benjamin advances two arguments for introducing a right of use on the basis of a 
security interest. Neither of these arguments seems convincing and they are refuted 
below. 
 
1. First, Benjamin argues that whereas the outright transfer method and 
insolvency set-off are generally enforceable under English law, this may not be the 
                                                 
183 In the case of the insolvency of the prime broker, and also if the hedge fund’s assets have not yet 
been ‘used’ by the prime broker, there is a considerable risk that under current law a judge will re-
characterise a security interest combined with a right of use as an outright transfer, irrespective of the 
terms of the prime brokerage documentation. In this case the hedge fund is left with an unsecured 
contractual claim only. 
184 See Benjamin (2000), sections 10.49-10.59; J. Benjamin, M. Yates, G. Montagu, The Law of Global 
Custody; Legal Risk Management in Securities Investment and Collateral, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 
2002, sections 4.8, 4.33, 4.34. Cf. the section on margin lending in section 3 of the introduction to this 
report. 
185 The 1995 Deed subject to English law (one of the Credit Support Documents preceding the 2001 
Margin Provisions) also made it possible to vest a security interest. However, no right of use could be 
established in connection with the security interest. See Paragraph 6(d) of the 1995 UK Deed. 
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case in foreign jurisdictions. In this scenario an outright transfer is not appropriate. 
The alternative proposed by Benjamin is a security interest combined with a right of 
use in order to reach the same economic result.186
 
The argument concerning outright transfer and set-off is, however, no longer valid for 
transactions covered by the law of a Member State of the European Union after the 
implementation of the Collateral Directive187. The Collateral Directive recognises the 
outright transfer method and insolvency set-off in the case of collateralised 
transactions. Also it is submitted that whereas the economic purpose of the outright 
transfer and the right of use structures is identical, their legal characterisation (and 
their treatment for tax, accounting and capital adequacy purposes, for example) 
should also be the same. A security interest combined with a right of use is essentially 
an outright transfer. 
 
2. Benjamin’s second argument in favour of a right of use is as follows. A legal 
interest can be delivered in respect of securities not held by an intermediary. If a third 
party ‘C’ obtains a legal interest in these securities from a collateral taker ‘B’, this 
interest is protected against the original collateral provider ‘A’s equity of redemption, 
if ‘C’ is acting in good faith. However, if ‘C’ acquires an interest in securities that are 
held by an intermediary, this interest is not legal but equitable, and is subject to ‘A’s 
equity of redemption. Because of the increasingly important role played by 
intermediaries, the tendency is therefore that the position of third parties acquiring 
securities worsens (because legal interests are replaced by equitable ones).188
 
It is, however, too simple to argue – as would be the result if a right of use on the 
basis of a security interest were introduced – that the equity of redemption, the duty 
of due care in respect of encumbered assets and the prohibition of appropriation can 
simply be set aside. These characteristics of a security interest guarantee that the 
interests of a collateral provider and a collateral taker are balanced. A security interest 
without these characteristics, such as a security interest combined with a right of use 
as envisaged in the Collateral Directive, is essentially an outright transfer. 
 
If, as in Benjamin’s example, party ‘A’ grants a security interest combined with a 
right of use in respect of interests in securities (held by an intermediary) to party ‘B’, 
this essentially entails an outright transfer of ‘A’s equitable interest to ‘B’. Party ‘C’ 
cannot therefore, after having acquired this equitable interest from party ‘B’, be faced 
with an equity of redemption invoked by ‘A’. A has no equity of redemption, because 
an outright transfer has taken place. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Under English law, a custodian has no right to dispose of its clients’ assets for the 
benefit of its own business. This is incompatible with the rights of a beneficiary of a 
trust. In accordance with its fiduciary duties, the custodian must take the interests of 
clients into account and cannot dispose of them freely. 
 
                                                 
186 See Benjamin (2000), section 5.67. Cf. in particular Articles 6 and 7 of the CD. 
187 See footnote 4 above. 
188 See Benjamin (2000), sections 5.68-69. 
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Generally speaking, the only way a collateral provider can grant a ‘right of use’ to a 
collateral taker under current English law is a transfer of ownership. A right of 
disposal cannot be granted on the basis of a security interest, in particular because it is 
incompatible with the equity of redemption. Such a structure should be re-
characterised as an outright transfer. These considerations also apply to the special 
relationship between a client and its custodian. Only if a client transfers his rights to a 
custodian outright does the latter have the right to dispose of the transferred assets. 
Under English law, a custodian cannot dispose of assets on the basis of a security 
interest. 
 
No good arguments are available to justify a ‘right of use’ on the basis of a security 
interest under English law. A ‘right of use’ is incompatible with essential 
characteristics of a security interest, such as the duty of due care, the prohibition of 
appropriation and the equity of redemption. The proper approach is to characterise 
cases of this kind as an outright transfer. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
This report has investigated what interests are involved where a right of use is granted 
in respect of securities. By a right of use we mean an owner’s customary right of 
disposal (i.e. a right to encumber the securities with a limited right, or to transfer 
ownership thereof). 
 
Three interests are involved when discussing a right of use. Generally, a right of use 
enhances the liquidity of the financial markets, which is to the benefit of all players. 
A closely related, but distinct interest is that of the major financial market 
participants. The interests of the markets in general and of its major players are 
benefited by easy access to assets. The focus of this report has been on the interests of 
collateral providers and clients of custodians. 
 
If a collateral provider vests a security interest for the benefit of a collateral taker, he 
vests a limited right and expects to retain his ownership right. His ownership right is 
usually protected by mechanisms such as the duty of the collateral taker to take due 
care, the prohibition of appropriation, and the equity of redemption. These are basic 
principles of property law, which in one way or another are present in all legal 
systems discussed in this report. A right of use on the basis of a security interest sets 
all these principles aside. 
 
A security interest combined with a right of use is currently envisaged in the 
European Collateral Directive189. It does not only apply to commercial transactions 
generally, for example to the Over-The-Counter market, but also to the relationship 
between a client and its custodian. 
 
A right of use on the basis of contractual consent is even more noteworthy. The 
question whether a right of use can be granted on the basis of ‘consent’, i.e. on a 
contractual basis, has – surprisingly enough – only been brought up in the relationship 
between a client and its custodian. Understandable, because custodians are under a 
commercial pressure to use their clients’ assets.190 But surprising, because it is clearly 
not in the interest of clients that their assets are disposed of (unless they have 
unequivocally transferred ownership of these assets to the custodian), and because 
clients are the weaker party in the client-custodian relationship and deserve 
protection. A consent based right of use is presently envisaged in securities 
regulations in, for example, Denmark and Italy. 
 
A collateral provider or the client of a custodian does not expect to lose his 
proprietary interest in securities if he vests a security interest, or on the basis of mere 
‘consent’. Therefore, the fundamental argument of this report is that the interests of 
collateral providers and clients of custodians should be taken into account by using 
the outright transfer technique. This is the most adequate and prudent way to grant a 
right of use, because the interests of all parties involved are appropriately considered. 
                                                 
189 See footnote 4 above. 
190 Cf. Benjamin (2000), cit. (footnote 29), section 5.46. 
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1. The security interest approach 
 
General considerations 
Different jurisdictions tend to have a slightly different approach where the protection 
of the position of the provider of a security interest is concerned. The focus may be 
on the ‘duty of due care’ of the collateral taker, on the prohibition of appropriation of 
the pledged assets by the collateral taker, or on the equity of redemption of the 
collateral provider. In all cases, however, the same goal is served, i.e. to safeguard the 
ownership interest of the collateral provider. A right of use on the basis of a security 
interest, as for example set out in Article 5 of the Collateral Directive, does not do 
justice to these considerations and only takes the interests of the collateral taker into 
account. 
 
United States 
A general right of disposal for a secured party cannot be derived from Article 9-207 
of the UCC, because the secured party should always respect the remaining 
proprietary interest of the collateral provider. Under certain circumstances a right to 
dispose can be granted to a secured party on a contractual basis, but the proceeds of 
the sale are in this case subject to the pre-sale proprietary rights. The ISDA Margin 
Provisions (New York law) for margin provided under derivatives transactions 
envisage no such proprietary substitution, or any proprietary interest of the collateral 
provider whatsoever. The structure envisaged in these Margin Provisions, i.e. a 
security interest combined with an unlimited right of disposal for the collateral taker, 
is therefore essentially that of an outright transfer. Note that under American law 
repos and securities lending transactions are commonly structured as an outright 
transfer. 
 
Europe 
The right of use on the basis of a security interest as set out in the Collateral Directive 
is incompatible with the property law systems of Denmark, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
 
Danish, Dutch, German and Italian law 
In the chapters on Danish, Dutch and German law it was investigated whether a right 
of use on the basis of a security interest can be explained in a satisfactory way by 
looking at the theory in relation to 1) the realisation of a security interest, 2) the re-
pledge, 3) proprietary representation (i.e. the sale on commission and, in particular, 
the consignment sale), 4) perishable goods, and 5) the irregular pledge. Because it 
appeared that the irregular pledge is most appropriate to explain the new concept of a 
right of use, the former was also investigated in depth in the chapter on Italian law.191
 
The consignment sale and the irregular pledge come closest to what the right of use is 
about. In both cases a general right of disposal is granted to the counterparty of the 
original owner. The structure of these two constructions is, however, essentially 
different. The chapters on Danish, Dutch, German and Italian law show that it is the 
irregular pledge that matches the structure of the right of use envisaged by the 
Collateral Directive192: 
                                                 
191 Even though it is uncertain if the irregular pledge concept can relate to dematerialised securities, 
Italian law also knows the ‘riporto’, which - like the irregular pledge - entails a transfer of ownership. 
192 Cf. the drawings and the explanatory comments thereto in chapter 2 on Dutch and German law. 
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Security interest combined with a right of use / irregular pledge 
 
  T=1; €    T=2; € 
  <--------------------  <-------------------- 
 A --------------------> B --------------------> C 
  T=1; (irregular) pledge  T=2; execution of right of disposal 
  plus right of disposal 
 
  T=4; return of €  T=3; € 
-------------------->  --------------------> 
<--------------------  <-------------------- D 
  T=4; equivalent assets  T=3; buying equivalent assets in the market 
 
The irregular pledge and the right of use envisaged in the Collateral Directive 
coincide on the following points: 1) the security interest is vested to secure a claim of 
the ‘pledgee’ towards the ‘pledgor’; 2) the parties are under an obligation to transfer 
equivalent assets at the end of the transaction; 3) both concepts entail a transfer of 
ownership; and 4) the economic interest of the irregular pledge or the pledge 
combined with a right of use rests with the ‘pledgee’, because he can enter into 
further trades with the ‘pledged’ assets for his own benefit. Article 5 of the CD should 
therefore be implemented according to the principles governing the irregular pledge. 
 
The concept of ‘replaceability’ explains why a transfer of ownership takes place in 
the case of irregular pledge, usufruct or custody. Replaceability means that 1) the 
pledgee, usufructuary or custodian can dispose of the asset, and 2) is under a 
contractual obligation to transfer equivalent assets. The result of consenting to such 
replaceability is that a transfer of ownership takes place and that the provider of the 
right of pledge or usufruct, or the client of the custodian, is left with a contractual 
claim.193
 
Only as far as the crucial timing issue is concerned, does the Collateral Directive 
deviate from the irregular pledge theory. As far as the irregular pledge, usufruct and 
custody are concerned, it is generally accepted that the transfer of ownership takes 
place at the moment the irregular structure is agreed. The transferor loses his 
proprietary interest at the moment he consents to replaceability. From that moment on 
he is left with a contractual claim. This is generally accepted under German and 
Dutch law, and is also the position in Danish and Italian legal theory. Article 5 of the 
Collateral Directive, however, is not in line with this theory, because it envisages that 
the ownership right of the collateral provider is maintained until the moment the 
collateral taker chooses to dispose of the pledged assets. Only here does the Collateral 
Directive need to be implemented by referring to the principles governing the 
consignment sale. In the case of a consignment sale, the consignor loses his 
ownership right at the moment the assets are sold by the consignee. 
 
English law 
Under English law, the only way a collateral provider can grant a ‘right of use’ to a 
collateral taker is by way of a transfer of ownership. A general right of disposal 
                                                 
193 Also in the case of a loan of fungibles – ‘verbruiklening’ under Dutch law, ‘Darlehen’ under 
German law – assets are essentially made replaceable. That is why under Dutch and German law also a 
loan of fungibles leads to a transfer of ownership. 
 55
cannot be granted on the basis of a security interest. The main reason for this is that a 
right of disposal for a collateral taker is incompatible with the characteristics of a 
security interest, such as the equity of redemption, the duty of due care and the 
prohibition of appropriation. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion drawn from an analysis of the position prevailing in different 
countries is that the right of use of the Collateral Directive is essentially an irregular 
pledge (i.e. an outright transfer) from the point of view of Danish, German, Dutch and 
Italian law, whereas it should be re-characterised as an outright transfer under English 
law. A right of use based on a security interest is therefore nothing more than a 
transfer of ownership. 
 
The main argument against allowing a pledgee always to dispose of the pledged 
assets is that a pledgor expects to remain the owner of them until an event of default 
takes place. Essentially, however, he is left with a contractual claim for the redelivery 
of equivalent assets. In the event of the collateral taker’s insolvency, his only remedy 
is to set this claim off against the money received from the collateral taker. However, 
if the prices of the securities provided to the collateral taker go up (and in the absence 
of proper margin arrangements), the collateral provider runs an unsecured credit risk 
in respect of the collateral taker. In the event of the collateral taker’s insolvency, his 
contractual claim will have to compete with the claims of other unsecured creditors 
on the basis of the pari passu principle. Because collateral takers are usually powerful 
banks, and collateral providers can – according to the Collateral Directive – also be 
small and medium sized enterprises, this scenario is unacceptable.194
 
It is submitted that the right of use under the Collateral Directive should be 
implemented in the laws of the EU Member States as an outright transfer of 
ownership. In for example Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy this could 
be done by using the device of the pignus irregolare (basically a transfer of 
ownership).195
 
The structure of the irregular pledge exactly reflects that of the right of use under the 
Collateral Directive. Only as far as the timing is concerned does the structure 
envisaged in the Collateral Directive deviate from that of the irregular pledge. Under 
an irregular pledge, ownership passes at the moment the parties agree to the irregular 
pledge. Under the Collateral Directive, ownership passes at the (usually) later 
moment when the collateral taker chooses to dispose of the pledged asset. 
 
Note that the Collateral Directive poses the additional problem of proprietary 
substitution. Under Danish, Dutch and German law the device of proprietary 
substitution is only allowed in a limited number of situations. In the case of 
perishable goods, insurance payments, damages and appropriation by the government, 
                                                 
194 Note that the rule of proprietary substitution does not help the collateral provider. Proprietary 
substitution will usually take place at the end of a transaction. In the course of the transaction the 
collateral provider has an unsecured exposure in respect of the collateral taker. Cf. footnote 17 above. 
195 If the irregular pledge concept is not available, such as may be the case of Italian fully 
dematerialised securities, comparable concepts of civil law that also entail an outright transfer (such as 
a loan of fungible assets - ‘verbruiklening’ under Dutch law or ‘Darlehen’ under German law –, or the 
Italian riporto arrangement) can be applied to implement the right of use under the Collateral Directive. 
 56
proprietary substitution is possible. This protects the pledgee, because his security 
interest continues to exist. In the case of the consignment sale or the irregular pledge, 
for example, no proprietary substitution takes place, because under current law 
substitution is not meant to protect trading arrangements. The proprietary substitution 
rule under the Collateral Directive therefore goes further than is currently possible. 
This novelty should be taken into account when implementing the Collateral 
Directive. 
 
 
2. The client – custodian relationship 
 
American and English law 
Under English and American law, a custodian does not have the right to dispose of its 
clients’ assets for the benefit of its own business. Under English law, this is 
incompatible with the rights of a beneficiary of a trust. Under American law, Article 8 
of the UCC requires a custodian always to have sufficient assets in place to fulfil the 
demands of its clients (the ‘perfect match system’). A custodian must therefore take 
the interests of clients into account and cannot dispose of the assets freely. 
 
Under both American and English law, a custodian has the right to dispose of its 
clients’ assets freely only if an unambiguous transfer of proprietary interests (legal 
and/or beneficial) has taken place. In the American derivatives markets, a right of use 
can also be granted on the basis of a security interest, even though this structure is 
very much similar to an outright transfer. Under English law, a custodian cannot be 
given a general right of disposal on the basis of a security interest. 
 
Under English law, it is sometimes argued that a prime broker (a financial institution 
providing a bundle of financial services to hedge funds) can dispose of its clients’ 
assets on the basis of a security interest. This construction, however, should also be 
characterised as an outright transfer. 
 
Replaceability leads to outright transfer 
An irregular deposit – as understood by the Danish, Dutch, German and Italian 
systems – is a deposit of replaceable assets with a custodian. Replaceability means, as 
in the case of the irregular pledge and the irregular usufruct (see above), that the 
custodian can dispose of the deposited assets in exchange for a contractual delivery 
obligation of equivalent assets. An irregular deposit entails a transfer of ownership. 
 
Dutch law 
At present, a custodian’s right of use is not possible under Dutch law, unless a 
transfer of ownership takes place. An unlimited right of disposal cannot be granted on 
the basis of a security interest or on the basis of a contractual arrangement. Present 
practice is therefore based on outright transfers (notably securities lending 
arrangements). Only a limited right of use can be granted on the basis of, for example, 
a re-pledge. 
 
In the Dutch chapter on the client-custodian relationship, it has been suggested that a 
right of use on the basis of a security interest as envisaged in the Collateral Directive 
does not conflict with the fiduciary client-custodian relationship, if 1) the investor 
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realises the legal implications of a right of use to their full extent, and 2) the investor 
has given his consent. This view is controversial. 
 
It is of course the custodian who should explain the legal implications of a right of 
use to its clients. It should explain that a pledge with a right of use is something 
essentially different from a traditional right of pledge, and that there is no prohibition 
of appropriation, no duty of due care and no right of redemption in order to protect 
the client’s ownership interest. It is somewhat naive to rely fully on the ability and 
willingness of commercial banks to explain to their clients what the implications of a 
right of use actually are (i.e. the client loses its ownership right and is left with a 
contractual claim). Commercial banks are under a strong economic pressure to use 
the assets of their clients.196
 
In addition, it is argued that the investor should give full consent. As was 
demonstrated above, consenting to dispositions by a custodian in exchange for a 
contractual obligation to transfer equivalent assets makes assets replaceable, which 
implies a transfer of ownership from a civil law point of view. 
 
The proper approach is therefore that a right of use should be possible on an outright 
transfer basis only. If the outright transfer method is used, no complicated 
explanations about the deformed right of pledge are necessary; every investor should 
understand that he loses his ownership rights in this case. From an investor protection 
point of view, the outright transfer method is therefore preferable over a right of use 
on the basis of a security interest. These considerations are particularly important if 
the client is not a major financial institution, but for example a small or medium-sized 
enterprise. 
 
Danish and Italian law 
Following the implementation of the second indent of Article 10 of the Investment 
Services Directive (‘ISD’)197 in Danish law, dealers in securities can dispose of their 
clients’ assets on the basis of mere consent. Even though the legislative history does 
not make entirely clear how the relevant provision should be interpreted, it is argued 
in the Danish chapter that the consent-based formula is nothing more than an irregular 
deposit (cf. the remarks on replaceability above). Therefore, if consent is given, the 
custodian becomes the owner of the assets and the client has a contractual claim for 
the redelivery of equivalent assets. 
 
Under Italian law a depository can dispose of the assets of its clients after a transfer of 
ownership. An irregular deposit entails a transfer of ownership. As under Danish law, 
the implementation of the Investment Services Directive has lead to the appearance of 
a consent-formula in Italian securities regulations, on the basis of which financial 
intermediaries can dispose of their clients’ assets.198
 
                                                 
196 Cf. Benjamin (2000), section 5.46. Because their interests are therefore diametrically opposed to 
those of their clients, it is advisable to oblige custodians to inform their clients and to monitor their 
behaviour in practice. 
197 See footnotes 6 and 8 above. 
198 Article 10 of the ISD relates to ‘investment firms’. Article 3(b) of the Danish Financial Business Act 
– the implementation of the second indent of Article 10 of the ISD – applies to ‘dealers in securities’. 
The relevant Bank of Italy regulation relates to ‘financial intermediaries’. 
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A right of use is incompatible with investment and custody services 
On the basis of the second indent of Article 10 of the Investment Services Directive 
an investment firm can ‘use’ (for ‘use’ read ‘dispose of’) the assets of investors for its 
own account, provided that the investor has consented to such use. The ‘consent’ 
formula also features in Articles 12(8) and 12(9) of the Proposal for a Directive on 
Financial Instruments Markets.199
 
The meaning of the words ‘for its own account’ in the second indent of Article 10 of 
the ISD is not clear. Does ‘for its own account’ mean ‘in the investment firm’s own 
name, but for the benefit of the investor’ (the ‘best case’ scenario) or does it mean ‘in 
the investment firm’s own name and for the firm’s own benefit’ (the ‘worst case’ 
scenario)? Usually, ‘for its own account’ means ‘for its own benefit’ (this would 
mean that the worst case scenario applies). But recital 29 of the ISD states: ‘this 
principle [i.e. the protection of investors’ ownership rights; TK] does not, however, 
prevent a firm from doing business in its name but on behalf of the investor, where 
that is required by the very nature of the transaction and the investor is in agreement, 
for example stock lending’. The words ‘on behalf of the investor’ point in the 
direction of the best case scenario. However, the words ‘stock lending’ point in the 
direction of the worst case scenario again, because stock lending usually (for example 
under the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement) entails an outright transfer of 
ownership without any limitation. 
 
The core task of an investment firm is to administer its clients’ assets safely, and to 
invest them for the benefit of these clients. Dispositions by an investment firm of its 
clients’ assets for its own benefit are incompatible with this core task. The proper 
interpretation of the words ‘for its own account’ in the second indent of Article 10 of 
the ISD is therefore that they mean ‘in the investment firm’s own name, but for the 
benefit of the investor’. 
 
This means that if the investor consents to ‘use’, as within the meaning of the second 
indent of Article 10 of the ISD, the investment firm is not entirely free to dispose. 
Because of the fiduciary nature of the client-investment firm relationship, the firm 
can only dispose for the benefit of the investor. This situation is similar to that of the 
sale on commission (cf. section 3 of chapter 2 on German and Dutch law) and a trust 
relationship (cf. chapter 5 on English law). Like the agent and the trustee, the 
investment firm is limited when it disposes of the original owner’s assets in that it 
must take his interests into account. Therefore, only if an investor unequivocally 
transfers all interests (legal and beneficial) to the investment firm, is the investment 
firm free – in deviation from its core task – to dispose of the investor’s assets for its 
own benefit. 
 
Should the ‘worst case’ scenario apply (as appears to be the case under Danish law; 
see above), meaning that the investment firm can dispose of its clients’ assets in its 
own name and for its own benefit, the analysis is as follows. In this case, the client 
essentially consents to making assets replaceable. This automatically triggers an 
outright transfer (cf. the remarks on replaceability above). In this case, the client runs 
an insolvency risk in respect of the investment firm. 
 
                                                 
199 Interinstitutional File 2002/0269 (COD), 11150/1/03 REV 1, EF 34, ECOFIN 202, CODEC 947. 
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Traditionally, custodians have an essentially different function from investment 
firms.200 Custodians are designed to keep and administer their clients’ assets safely. 
The ISD has not been written with the client-custodian relationship in mind.201 In any 
case – as in the case of investment firms – it is also contrary to a custodian’s function 
to dispose of the assets that it holds in custody for its clients for its own benefit. 
 
In many cases, clients may not realise the consequences of contractual consent to 
‘use’ to their full extent. In particular, clients do not expect investment firms and 
custodians to dispose of their assets for their own benefit, because such disposals are 
incompatible with the core task of the institutions (i.e. to keep and administer their 
clients’ assets safely, and to earn money for their clients). Investment firms and 
custodians should not be able to dispose of their clients’ assets for their own benefit. 
The Proposal for a Directive on Financial Instruments Markets is a good opportunity 
to clarify the ‘consent’ formula of the Investment Services Directive and to take the 
interests of investors into account. 
 
The proposed general right of intermediaries in securities (including investment firms 
and custodians) to dispose of their clients’ assets for their own benefit, as envisaged 
in the UNIDROIT Second Session Report, should be rejected on the basis of the 
above argument. 
 
 
3. The outright transfer method 
 
A right of use enhances the liquidity of the financial markets. A right of use should be 
granted on the basis of an outright transfer in order to protect the interests of 
collateral providers and clients of custodians. A collateral provider or the client of a 
custodian does not expect to be left with a contractual claim only if he vests a security 
interest or enters into a purely contractual arrangement. 
 
The country reports clearly show that market participants use the outright transfer 
technique when entering into collateralised transactions. This is the approach of 
internationally used standard agreements such as the Global Master Repurchase 
Agreement (repos) and the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (securities 
lending). Present practice in Germany and The Netherlands is that repos and 
securities lending are indeed structured as outright transfers. In the United Kingdom 
too, collateral is provided on the basis of transfer of title. This is illustrated by the 
ISDA Margin Provisions (UK law). The outright transfer method is also a perfectly 
viable way to provide collateral in the U.S., and is the standard in the American repo 
and securities lending markets. As present practice shows, it is perfectly possible to 
reach the goal of liquid markets on the basis of the outright transfer approach. 
 
 
 
                                                 
200 The custody function can be carried out by Central Securities Depositories (‘CSD’) such as the 
Vaerdipapircentralen (Denmark) and Monte Titoli S.p.A. (Italy); by International Central Securities 
Depositories (‘ICSD’) such as Clearstream or Euroclear; but also by other institutions, such as for 
example banks. 
201 See Article 3(1) in conjunction with Annex C of the ISD. Cf. on this issue, Benjamin (2002), cit. 
(footnote 184), section 7.52. 
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4. Tax 
 
The tax consequences of a re-characterisation of a security interest combined with a 
right of use into an outright transfer are discussed in the Tax Appendix to this report. 
The Tax Appendix focuses on possible corporate income tax and withholding tax 
consequences and also pays some attention to the tax consequences in the case of 
participations of a certain percentage (e.g. the participation exemption, the fiscal unity 
regime). A security right combined with a right of use will not have corporate income 
tax consequences for a collateral provider if it is ‘derecognised’ for tax purposes, i.e. 
if it is not considered as a full transfer of economic and legal ownership for tax 
purposes. The right of use does, however, usually have income tax implications for 
the collateral taker, if – and this will typically be the case – the collateral taker 
exercises his right of use and transfers the assets to a third party. Subsequent gains 
and losses due to price fluctuations are relevant for income tax purposes. As far as 
withholding tax is concerned, in most jurisdictions a collateral taker with a right of 
use will be the party who can claim a refund or a credit of this withholding tax. 
Where a security interest is vested without a right of use, it would be the collateral 
provider who could claim the refund or credit. The characterisation of the right of use 
is also relevant in the context of 1) the beneficial tax treatment of shareholdings of at 
least 5%, 10% or 25% (the applicable percentage depends on how EU Member States 
have implemented the participation exemption), and 2) the Dutch fiscal unity regime 
that can be elected for if a taxpayer has legal and economic ownership of at least 95% 
of the shares of a company. 
 
Because the tax treatment of collateralised transactions differs across the Member 
States of the European Union, harmonisation in this respect is desirable. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
A ‘right of use’ on the basis of a security interest (if agreed) or on the basis of mere 
consent as envisaged in the Collateral Directive and the Investment Services 
Directive respectively, is in the interest of collateral takers and investment firms 
(usually major financial institutions). It gives them the right to dispose of their 
counterparty’s assets. It is, however, misleading to collateral providers and investors 
(who may be small entities and even individuals). 
 
‘Use’ normally means the act of employing a thing, not to dispose of that thing. A 
‘security interest’ in its current meaning entails a limited right of disposal in the event 
of default, never a general right of disposal. A basic feature of ‘investment services’ 
is the disposal of a client’s assets by an investment firm for the benefit of the client, 
not for the benefit of the investment firm. The term ‘custody services’ is commonly 
understood to comprise safekeeping and administration of clients’ assets, and not 
disposals of these assets by the custodian for its own benefit. All this is confusing to 
unsophisticated collateral providers and investors who may not be experts in the 
financial markets. Because the normal meaning of the words in question has been 
distorted, they may not realise that ‘consent to use’ actually leads to an outright 
transfer of their proprietary interest, and that as a result they run an insolvency risk in 
respect of the collateral taker or investment firm. 
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Proper information about the consequences of consenting to ‘use’ could alleviate the 
pain, but it is not likely that collateral takers and investment firms will always be able 
or willing to provide such information, in particular because they are under a strong 
economic pressure to dispose of their counterparty’s assets. 
 
Current market practice shows that liquid cash and securities markets can perfectly 
well be reached on the basis of the outright transfer technique. The consequences of 
this technique are obvious to all parties involved. On the basis of the above, it is 
submitted that a right of use would benefit the interests of all market participants if it 
were based on an unambiguous outright transfer. 
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TAX APPENDIX 
 
Executive summary on tax issues relevant to the right of use granted under the 
Collateral Directive 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In order to examine any tax effects of a security interest with a right of use, a good 
understanding of the legal consequences of granting securities collateral is essential. 
The main issue here is whether a pledge effects an actual transfer of ownership of the 
underlying assets or not, because most tax jurisdictions take the transfer of legal title 
as a starting point to determine whether a taxable disposal has taken place. Ordinarily, 
granting a security interest will not lead to a taxable disposal, whereas an outright 
transfer will normally be considered as a disposal for tax purposes. In view of the 
conclusions drawn by the contributors of the report that a security interest together 
with a right of use is fairly similar to an outright transfer, granting a right of use may 
have serious tax consequences. 
 
Under Article 5(1) of the European Collateral Directive (‘CD’)202, the collateral taker 
can be granted the right of use of the pledged assets203 in his own name under the 
obligation to transfer equivalent collateral to the collateral provider. This right of use 
gives the possibility to the collateral taker to dispose of the collateral as if he were the 
owner, whether or not a default event has occurred. It has been suggested that from a 
property law point of view, a pledge with the right of use granted to the collateral 
taker is in effect similar to an outright transfer. The question is whether a pledge with 
a right of use might trigger a disposal for tax purposes in the hands of the collateral 
provider. Further, one may question whether the collateral taker should take this right 
of use into account for tax accounting purposes. 
 
This Appendix will give an overview of the tax treatment of collateral arrangements 
in various Member States of the European Union and the U.S.. It will discuss the 
following issues: 
 
1) Does the granting of a security interest on securities lead to a taxable disposal 
for the collateral provider? 
 
2) Does the return of the equivalent collateralised securities by the collateral 
taker lead to a taxable disposal? 
 
3) Who is entitled to a tax credit / refund in respect of withholding taxes levied 
on securities that are subject to a security interest with a right of use? 
 
Also some attention will be given to special tax treatment to so-called substantial 
interests. Many countries apply beneficial tax treatment to income (dividends and 
sometimes gains) derived from 25% or more shareholdings in other companies.204 
                                                 
202 See footnote 4 above. 
203 This contribution assumes only fungible assets are pledged. 
204 Some Member-States have reduced the threshold of 25% to 10% (Germany) or 5% (The 
Netherlands). 
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The report will shortly discuss the effects of the right of use to the granting of such 
special tax regime. 
 
 
2. Tax issues 
 
2.1 Transfer for corporate income tax purposes205
 
Generally, corporates subject to corporate income tax are taxable for (i) income 
derived from securities, such as interest and dividend income, and (ii) gains made on 
the sale of securities. Losses made on the sale of securities are ordinarily tax-
deductible.206 If securities are transferred under a collateral agreement, it is the 
question whether a ‘sale’ has to be considered for corporate tax purposes. If so, the 
collateral provider may be confronted with adverse tax consequences. In addition, if a 
sale is considered, does this automatically lead to the assumption that the collateral 
taker is the new owner of the securities for corporate tax purposes? 207 For the 
collateral taker, such assumption may result into a taxable disposal at the moment of 
the retransfer of equivalent securities. 
 
Although the transfer of legal title to securities is usually the starting point to consider 
a disposal for tax purposes, the countries involved in our report each have their own 
approach. For instance, in The Netherlands, Spain and France transfer of legal title 
leads in principle to a taxable disposal. However, if the economic ownership of the 
securities remains with the collateral provider, a disposal for tax purposes may be 
derecognised. This derecognition might be effected by recharacterising the collateral 
transfer as a securities lending transaction, such as in France under certain 
circumstances, or on the basis of sound business practice in The Netherlands. 
 
In Germany, Luxembourg and the U.S., the basis to decide whether a taxable disposal 
occurs is the treatment of the transfer for general accounting purposes.208 Under 
general accounting purposes, the transfer of ‘control’ over the asset is decisive for 
disposal rather than the transfer of economic or legal ownership of the asset. 
Although having control over an asset has similarities with having the legal 
ownership of securities, such as having the right to dispose of the collateralised 
assets, control can also be attributed to the economic owner on a contractual basis 
without formally transferring legal title. In addition, the control over an asset also 
implies that the fruits derived from the collateralised assets can be enjoyed, which 
seems equal to having the economic ownership of an asset. Also in jurisdictions 
                                                 
205 This report will only focus on corporate income tax issues and not on individual income tax issues. 
206 This is different if a special tax regime applies to substantial shareholdings. Under such regime, 
dividends are tax-exempt and also the capital gain made on a sale may be exempt from tax. 
Consequently, a loss made on a sale of a substantial interest is non-deductible for corporate income tax 
purposes. 
207 It has been recommended by the Giovannini Group in Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement 
Arrangements in the European Union, Brussels, November 2001, and by the BIS-IOSCO report 
Recommendations for securities settlement systems, Recommendation 5, November 2001, that Member 
States should provide for tax rules which determine that a transfer for security purposes does not lead 
to a disposal for tax purposes. See also the suggestion of the European Commission in the 
Communication Clearing and settlement in the European Union, Main policy issues and future 
challenges, for a further research on the tax treatment of secured loans, swaps and repo’s. 
208 Such as the treatment under general accounting standards like IAS, GAAP and FASB. 
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which take ‘control’ as a starting point, a disposal for tax purposes may be 
derecognised by means of, for instance, a recharacterisation of the transaction into a 
securities lending transaction. 
 
Generally, most countries have special regulations under which an outright transfer 
under a collateral agreement can be denied for tax purposes. Subsequently, a return of 
equivalent assets by the collateral taker does normally not lead to a disposal for tax 
purposes. Would the first transfer be considered as a disposal for tax purposes, and 
thus the return of equivalent assets also, the return of the assets will usually not lead 
to a taxable gain for the collateral taker because the gain on the assets is reduced by a 
similar loss on the obligation to return the assets. Only if the collateral taker has 
disposed of the assets during the term of the collateral agreement, a taxable gain or 
loss may be made upon the return of the assets if the value of the assets after disposal 
has changed. Basically, after the collateral taker has disposed of the assets to a third 
party, only the redelivery obligation of equivalent assets to the collateral provider is 
left. Would the value of the securities decrease, than the collateral taker will realise a 
taxable gain on the redelivery obligation. If the right of use is granted to the collateral 
taker, the latter will normally use the securities received under the collateral. As such, 
a collateral arrangement under which a right of use is granted will generally lead to 
different tax consequences for the collateral taker than a standard security 
arrangement. 
 
 
2.2 Withholding tax refunds on dividend and interest paid on cross-border 
collateralised assets 
 
If dividends are paid on securities, generally dividend withholding tax is levied on 
those dividends by the source state, i.e. the state of residence of the issuer. Under 
double tax treaties, this source tax is usually limited to a maximum of 15% in respect 
of portfolio investments. The reduced amount of 15% is usually available at source, 
i.e. at the moment the dividend is paid, or by means of a refund afterwards.209 In the 
latter case, the domestic withholding tax rate is first withheld at the moment of 
distribution and afterwards the recipient can ask for a refund of the amount of tax 
withheld exceeding the applicable treaty rate. The state of residence of the 
shareholder will take the gross dividend into account for income tax purposes and 
will give a credit for the foreign 15% tax levied by the source state. 
 
Equal tax treatment applies to interest paid on bonds, albeit that under most double 
taxation treaties European Member States, if being the source country, are not 
allowed to levy withholding tax on interest payments if the payment is received by 
the beneficial owner of the interest. The reduction to a zero rate is granted by way of 
an exemption at source or a refund afterwards. Because of the zero rate, the state of 
residence of the recipient does not have to grant a credit for foreign withholding tax. 
 
As far as an exemption or refund of withholding tax is concerned with respect to 
dividends or interest paid on collateralised securities, the exemption or refund is 
ordinarily only granted to the ‘beneficial owner’ of the income. The definition of 
                                                 
209 Within a domestic context, withholding tax is usually an advanced payment of corporate income 
tax. Therefore, the withholding tax can be credited against the corporate income tax due at the end of 
the year. 
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‘beneficial owner’ has however no clear-cut meaning. Although many countries 
consider the ‘economic owner’ as the ‘beneficial owner’, no general accepted 
interpretation is available on the meaning of economic ownership. For instance, 
Germany and Luxembourg grant the tax refund to the person who has the control of 
the asset, which does not per se require the legal or full economic ownership of the 
asset. Although Dutch parliamentary history indicates that the economic owner 
should be regarded as the beneficial owner, Dutch tax law lacks a separate definition 
of ‘economic owner’ but only includes an anti-abuse regulation to determine who is 
not considered as ‘beneficial owner’. The U.S. differentiates between domestic and 
cross-border situations, whereas France has specific anti-abuse regulations in respect 
of tax refunds regarding income on collateralised securities. 
 
Broadly speaking, it can be derived from the report that the person who is entitled to a 
tax benefit is ordinarily the person who receives the income and who bears the 
upward and downward risk on the assets including residual value risk.210 Granting the 
right of use of securities to the collateral taker might lead to the situation in which the 
collateral provider still has an economic interest in certain securities but no longer has 
the economic ownership of those specific securities. In other words, if the collateral 
taker has exercised its right of use and has sold the securities to a third party, that 
third party has both the legal ownership and economic ownership of those securities. 
After all, that third party is registered as legal owner, is entitled to the fruits and bears 
the (residual) value risk of those specific securities. Because the relation between the 
collateral provider and the specific asset has been broken, no tax benefits can be 
granted to the collateral provider in respect to those assets, even though the collateral 
provider still has an economic interest in the value of similar assets. 
 
If the collateral taker has the right of use but does not actually sell the securities, the 
collateral provider can still be regarded as the economic owner of the asset. When 
income is paid on collateralised securities, it is the question who is entitled to a tax 
benefit on those securities, the collateral taker or the collateral provider? Many 
countries have anti-abuse regulations in respect to cross-border securities lending and 
repo transactions due to the fact that under some double taxation treaties the 
maximum withholding tax rate is more than 15% in respect of dividends and more 
than 0% regarding interest. If the double tax treaty between country of residence of 
the collateral taker and the country of residence of the issuer is more beneficial than 
the double tax treaty concluded by the country of residence of the collateral provider, 
a tax benefit may be obtained if the collateral taker should be regarded as the 
beneficial owner. Whether a collateral transaction with a right of use would be 
attacked by anti-avoidance regulations remains unclear. 
 
In summary, it can be said that (i) under a standard collateral agreement not 
qualifying as an outright transfer, the collateral provider will be regarded as the 
beneficial owner entitled to a tax refund, (ii) if a right of use is granted and exercised 
by the collateral taker, no tax benefit can be claimed neither by the collateral taker nor 
by the collateral provider, and (iii) if a right of use is granted but not exercised by the 
collateral taker, it is questionable whether the collateral taker or collateral provider is 
entitled to a withholding tax refund. Clarity on this point is a must for a good 
functioning and liquid European capital market. 
                                                 
210 Residual value risk means the risk of loss, theft and destruction. 
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3. Right of use granted to intermediaries 
 
Generally speaking, it is of no relevance for tax purposes that book-entry securities 
are held through multiple intermediaries. Although the legal ownership is usually the 
starting point for tax ownership, it is the general view that custodians hold securities 
for their customers as agent or nominee. The accountholders are therefore considered 
as owner for tax purposes, even if they do not have legal title to the securities but only 
a debt claim against their custodian. For that reason, no special attention is given to 
the position of custodians or pledges to custodians by accountholders in this report. 
 
In principle, if securities are pledged by the accountholder to the custodian combined 
with a right of use, similar corporate tax issues may arise as described in paragraph 
2.1. In respect to the refund of withholding tax, granting the right of use could have 
adverse tax consequences similar to those described in paragraph 2.2. If a custodian 
obtains the right of use of securities pledged to him, it can be argued that the 
custodian no longer acts as a nominee or agent of the accountholder for those 
securities. As a consequence, withholding tax refunds may no longer be granted to the 
accountholder, who is the ultimate investor, but rather the custodian might be entitled 
to a withholding tax credit. If the custodian and the accountholder are not residents of 
the same country, different withholding tax rates can be applicable due to different 
double tax treaties. Anti-abuse provisions in respect of withholding tax refunds might 
therefore be triggered if the custodian is entitled to a more beneficial withholding tax 
rate. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Although the report shows that there are a lot of similarities on how collateral is 
treated for tax purposes by various countries, differences exist in the approach of 
issues as who is the owner for corporate income tax purposes and who is entitled to a 
withholding tax refund. In addition, it can be concluded that some countries have 
more sophisticated rules with regard to collateral such as France and the U.S., and 
countries in which unclarities exist and where less sophisticated rules apply such as 
Spain, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. Especially where countries characterise 
collateral transactions differently, a possibility for tax arbitrage may arise. However, 
one should bear in mind that the opposite of tax arbitrage is double taxation. It should 
therefore be wise to streamline at least the tax treatment of collateral within Europe, 
also in view of the liberalisation of the EU capital market. In view of the increased 
attention within the EU for the legal issues of collateral, this would be the moment to 
have a closer look at harmonisation in the tax field. 
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A) THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Dutch tax effects of the ‘right of use’ granted under Article 5 of the Collateral 
Directive 
 
 
1. Transfer of legal title – taxable disposal for income tax purposes? 
 
Generally, for Dutch individual income tax purposes a transfer of title to an asset held 
as investment is not considered a taxable event, i.e. there is no capital gain tax. Under 
Dutch corporate income tax law, normally a transfer of legal title to assets leads to a 
taxable disposal of the asset, i.e. the transferor incurs a taxable gain or loss. However, 
Dutch case law supports that if a transferor can still be considered as the economic 
owner of the transferred assets, the transfer may be derecognised for Dutch corporate 
income tax purposes. A taxpayer is considered to be the economic owner of the assets 
if the transferor still bears the upward and downward risk on the assets including 
residual value risk. 
 
 
2. Tax position collateral provider – corporate income tax 
 
2.1 Disposal or not 
 
For a collateral provider the intention of a collateral agreement – whether a pledge or 
outright transfer – is to provide security to another party and to re-acquire the full 
ownership of the asset (or similar asset) back in the future. The collateral taker has the 
obligation to return equivalent collateral, whereby in relation to financial instruments 
‘equivalent’ means financial instruments of the same issuer or debtor forming part of 
the same issue or class and of the same nominal amount, currency and description.211 
The collateral provider will therefore still have the same economic position in respect 
to the collateralised financial instruments and thus can he still be regarded as the 
economic owner of the collateralised assets. Taxation can therefore be deferred. 
 
Irrespective of the construction (a pledge, outright transfer or a pledge including a 
right of use), all collateral transactions will eventually receive equal corporate tax 
treatment. No corporate tax will be due on the collateralisation of the assets. The right 
of use granted to the collateral taker does not change the fact that the collateral 
provider has an economic interest in the collateralised assets. After all, the collateral 
taker has the obligation to redeliver equivalent collateral to the collateral provider, 
who will still bear the upward, downward and residual value risk on the assets. The 
term ‘equivalent collateral’ is of vital interest for the application of this derecognition 
treatment.212 From Dutch case law it can be derived that an asset may be capitalised 
on the taxpayer’s balance sheet if the asset is transferred under a fungible loan and the 
counterparty, although not obliged to keep the assets separate from its own other 
assets, is under the obligation to return assets from the same sort and quality.213
                                                 
211 Article 2(1)(i) of the CD. 
212 Please note that for corporate tax purposes, margin arrangements are irrelevant for the determination 
of tax ownership. 
213 Arnhem Court, 16 February 1961, no. 734/60, BNB 1961/307 and Supreme Court, 10 April 1996, 
no. 30637, BNB 1996/274. 
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Would the collateral taker not return assets from the same kind and quality or no 
assets at all, a taxable disposal will immediately be considered in respect of the 
collateral provider. Although Dutch tax law has a concept in which deferral of tax is 
allowed if assets are replaced with other assets that have the same economic function 
as the original assets, it is generally assumed that this replacement concept does not 
apply to different kind of portfolio securities.214
 
 
2.2 Special tax regimes 
 
There are two situations in which the right of use could have adverse Dutch corporate 
income tax consequences. In respect to special Dutch tax regimes whereby a traceable 
relation must exist between the legal owner of the underlying asset and the taxpayer 
(i.e. the economic owner of the asset), the right of use might lead to the loss of such 
special tax treatment (for example, the Dutch participation exemption which exempts 
income and gains on shareholdings of 5% or more from corporate tax). Due to the 
exercise of the right of use by the collateral taker, the relation between the legal 
owner (the collateral taker) and economic owner (the collateral provider) of one and 
the same asset is broken as the third party buyer of the asset will have both economic 
and legal ownership of the asset. The collateral provider is left with an economic 
position similar to that asset instead of having an economic ownership right directly 
enforceable against the legal owner of that asset. 
 
Further, in respect of the fiscal unity regime whereby Dutch resident companies can 
elect to be treated as one single taxpayer, the right of use may lead to the loss of such 
tax regime because both legal and economic ownership of 95% of the shares in the 
group companies are required for election. A pledge including the right of use of 
shares in a group company granted to a bank in relation to a loan, would bereft the 
original shareholder, i.e. the taxpayer, from the legal ownership of the shares. This 
might have great impact on the structuring of acquisition debt. 
 
 
3. Tax position collateral taker – corporate income tax 
 
Under a collateral agreement – irrespective the right of use – the collateral taker will 
normally capitalise the received securities as an asset and the obligation to redeliver 
the assets as a liability on his balance sheet. These two positions are in principle 
completely matching. As long as the collateral taker does not dispose of the 
securities, no actual taxable gain will arise because a possible increase of the value of 
the securities will be neutralised by a corresponding increase in value of the liability. 
Both the securities and redelivery obligation should be accounted for on a marked-to-
market basis, because there is no actual cost price paid by the collateral taker. At the 
moment of the return of the assets to the collateral provider, no tax will be due 
because the profit and loss on both positions will neutralise each other. 
 
If the collateral taker, on the basis of the right of use, disposes of the assets, a possible 
gain on the assets will be neutralised by a corresponding loss on the liability at the 
time of disposal to a third party. However, if after a disposal by the collateral taker 
                                                 
214 Supreme Court, 1 November 1989, no. 25 303, BNB 1990/92. 
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the value of the securities decreases, a taxable gain will arise in respect of the 
liability, i.e. the redelivery obligation (based on a marked-to-market valuation). 
Deferral of such gain till the moment equivalent assets are eventually repurchased on 
the market and returned to the collateral provider is unlikely. 
 
 
4. Dividend withholding tax credits215
 
If dividends are paid on securities, generally dividend withholding tax is levied on 
those dividends by the source state, i.e. the state of residence of the issuer. According 
to Dutch tax law, dividend withholding tax is levied from the beneficial owner of the 
dividend but withheld by the issuer of the securities. The tax is withheld on account 
of the shareholder, resulting in the receipt of the net dividend by the shareholder. 
Normally, the legal owner of the shares (or if the dividend coupons are held 
separately from the shares, the legal owner of the dividend coupons) is considered as 
beneficial owner. Dutch taxpayers are allowed to credit this dividend tax with their 
corporate or individual income tax due on the dividend income. In a domestic 
context, the dividend tax can therefore be considered as an advance levy of income 
tax. Non-residents may only apply for a refund of part of this dividend tax if a double 
tax treaty applies and certain conditions are met. A full refund is never granted to 
non-resident shareholders.216
 
In case of an outright transfer, the collateral taker, rather than the collateral provider 
is considered as the beneficial owner of the dividend distributed on the collateralised 
assets, because the collateral taker has legal title to the shares.217 As a result, the 
collateral taker should be entitled to a credit or refund of Dutch dividend withholding 
tax. This is contrary to a standard pledge whereby title to the securities is not 
transferred and the securities are booked on a collateral account in the name of the 
collateral provider. If the right of use should indeed be recharacterised as an outright 
transfer, this would also be of relevance for the determination of ownership for Dutch 
dividend tax purposes. 
 
Dutch anti-abuse regulations deny a credit or refund of Dutch dividend withholding 
tax to taxpayers who, in relation to a complex of transactions, pay a compensation for 
the loss of a dividend to individuals or legal entities that would have been entitled to a 
less favourable credit or refund than the taxpayer paying the compensation, and these 
individuals or legal entities remain, directly or indirectly, in the same (long) position 
in relation to a portfolio of equities that they already held before the transactions took 
place. As a consequence, if a Dutch taxpayer receives Dutch equities under an 
outright transfer collateral agreement from a non-resident collateral provider, this 
Dutch taxpayer is not entitled to a credit or refund of Dutch withholding tax. The 
same applies if two non-residents are involved whereby the collateral provider is in a 
less beneficial withholding tax position than the collateral taker. Recharacterisation of 
a pledge with a right of use into an outright transfer would then have the same 
                                                 
215 In principle, The Netherlands do not levy withholding tax on interest payments, unless the 
underlying debt in fact is recharacterised into equity. 
216 Apart form some foreign charitable institutions, foreign pension funds and foreign corporates 
holding more than 25% of the shares in a company. 
217 I refrain from the specific issue whether the collateral taker is rightly considered as legal owner if it 
concerns book-entry securities. 
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consequences. This may have a serious impact on the use of Dutch equities as 
collateral. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The introduction of Article 5 of the CD comprising the right of use of the collateral 
by the collateral taker does in principle not lead to a difference in Dutch corporate tax 
treatment of collateral. Nevertheless, one should be aware that in respect of Dutch 
special beneficial tax regimes such as the participation exemption and group election, 
the right of use may lead to the loss of this beneficial treatment. Although the transfer 
of legal title generally leads to a disposal for corporate income tax purposes, Dutch 
tax law grants the possibility of deferral as long as the transferor bears the economic 
risk of an asset. The right of use granted to the collateral taker does not affect the 
economic position of the collateral provider in respect to the collateralised assets. 
Also, the right of use does not change the tax position of the collateral taker. As long 
as the collateral taker does not dispose of the assets, there will be no corporate tax 
consequences for him. Upon disposal of the assets, this tax position will become 
different as the collateral taker then bears the economic risk of the assets via the 
redelivery obligation. 
 
If a pledge with the right of use is recharacterised as an outright transfer, parties 
should be aware of the adverse Dutch anti-abuse regulations which deny withholding 
tax credits and refunds if the collateral taker has a better dividend withholding 
position than the collateral provider. In other words, non-residents pledging Dutch 
equities to a Dutch collateral taker or a foreigner in a better withholding tax position 
could be confronted with a lower net compensation payment on the collateralised 
assets. 
 71
B) GERMANY 
 
German tax effects of the ‘right of use’ granted under Article 5 of the Collateral 
Directive 
 
 
1. Tax position collateral provider – corporate income tax 
 
If a security agreement constitutes a transfer of the full legal title of an asset to the 
collateral taker, the collateral provider remains the economic owner of the asset for 
German tax purposes. Therefore, the transfer of legal ownership of the securities does 
not trigger capital gains tax in Germany. Nevertheless, if that security agreement 
provides that the collateral taker may dispose of the collateralised asset, even if the 
collateral provider fulfils the secured obligations and no credit default occurs, the 
collateral taker will be regarded as the legal and economic owner of the asset. As a 
consequence, if a right of use is granted, the transfer of collateral will be regarded as a 
disposal of the asset. Such a disposal will, in general, trigger a capital gains tax at the 
level of the collateral provider if 
 
(i) The collateral provider is a company and holds the securities as a business 
asset (however, in certain cases the transfer of shares may be tax exempt), 
(ii) The collateral provider is a private person and the collateral provider holds 
at least a 1% interest of the shares in a corporation, or 
(iii) The collateral provider is a private person and disposes of the securities 
within a period of one year after acquisition. 
 
If the collateral provider is a company and holds the securities as a business asset, a 
transfer of the securities for security purposes is not regarded as a taxable disposal. 
The same is true, if the transaction is structured as a securities lending transaction 
(‘Wertpapierleihgeschäft’), in which (i) the collateral taker is obliged to retransfer 
equivalent assets to the collateral provider after a certain period of time, or (ii) the 
collateral provider can in its sole discretion claim the asset back at any time. 
 
 
2. Tax position collateral taker – corporate income tax 
 
In a securities lending transaction the collateral taker will capitalise the transferred 
asset and an obligation to retransfer the assets on its balance sheet. At the time the 
assets are returned, the asset and the obligation will be derecognised. In case of a 
security transfer, the transfer back to the collateral provider does not trigger a capital 
gains tax. 
 
 
3. Withholding tax credits 
 
Dividends paid by a German issuer to a non-resident individual or a non-resident 
corporation are subject to withholding tax, currently at a rate of 20 % plus solidarity 
surcharge. Within an international context, such a tax rate might be reduced pursuant 
to the provisions of an applicable double taxation treaty, if any. The amount equal to 
the spread between the national withholding tax rate and the treaty rate has to be 
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claimed in a special refund procedure from the Federal Tax Office (‘Bundesamt für 
Finanzen’). 
 
Pursuant to German tax law, dividend income is attributed to the economic owner of 
the underlying shares, even if the dividends are actually paid by the issuer to a party 
different from the economic owner. 
 
If the right of use is granted to the collateral taker, and thus the collateral taker is 
entitled to dispose of the underlying shares, the collateral taker might become the 
economic owner of the underlying shares. As German withholding tax law looks at 
the economic owner, the collateral taker will then be entitled to the refund of 
withholding tax. If the collateral taker, as economic owner, pays a manufactured 
dividend to the collateral provider, the economic ownership of the collateral taker is 
not adversely affected. In this case treaty protection will be available for the collateral 
taker. 
 
With regard to the notion of beneficial ownership as it is included in some German 
double taxation treaties as a requirement for a withholding tax reduction, the German 
tax administration will apply German tax law in order to interpret the notion of the 
beneficial owner. As the notion of beneficial ownership is unknown to German tax 
law and is only defined in some double taxation treaties (Sweden, Norway, Italy), the 
tax authorities will most likely regard the economic owner of the underlying shares as 
the beneficial owner within the meaning of the double taxation treaty. If the economic 
owner pays a manufactured dividend, such a payment will not infringe its position as 
economic or beneficial owner of the underlying share. 
 
Pursuant to the provisions of German tax law, the taxpayer is entitled to the foreign 
tax credit if granted under a treaty. Thus, from a German perspective, the economic 
owner of the underlying shares is entitled to the foreign withholding tax credit. If the 
collateral taker is entitled to dispose of the shares, the collateral taker will be regarded 
as the economic owner and is therefore entitled to the foreign withholding tax credit. 
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C) FRANCE 
 
French tax effects of the ‘right of use’ granted under Article 5 of the Collateral 
Directive 
 
 
1. Tax position collateral provider – corporate income tax 
 
In France, a pledge is in principle considered as a disposal for tax purposes. However, 
a special regime applies if the pledge can be considered as a securities lending 
transaction. In that case, the so-called securities lending tax neutrality system applies 
which means that a pledge does not result into a taxable disposal. This regime is 
available if the following requirements are met: 
 
- Asset transfer must result from transactions dealing with OTC derivatives. 
- The assets transferred are securities traded on an official securities market in 
France or in another country, securities traded on a secondary market or on an 
Over-The-Counter market, debt instruments negotiable on a regulated market 
and not likely to be listed, or Treasury bills. Subject to subsequent statements 
from the tax authorities, securities traded on the New Market should also be 
included. However, securities which, during the term of the transfer, pay a 
dividend or interest which carry a tax credit, are excluded. 
- The assets must be transferred ‘in full ownership, to serve as a pledge’. If the 
agreement governing the asset transfer is ruled by foreign law, the question is 
to know whether or not the aforementioned condition should be interpreted 
with regard to the relevant foreign law, or with regard to French law. This 
second hypothetical situation presents a problem in French law which does 
not make the distinction, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon legal systems, between 
legal title and economic title. If the condition is interpreted with regard to the 
relevant foreign law, which seems logical, the scope of application of the 
securities lending tax neutrality system will be limited. However, the 
legislator’s intention, as it was brought out in parliamentary debate, is to 
facilitate the proper functioning of these transactions on financial instruments. 
The hope is that the tax authorities will adopt a flexible interpretation of the 
concept of transfers ‘in full ownership, to serve as pledges’. 
- At least one of the two parties to the collateral agreement is an investment 
services provider or an institution, company or establishment benefiting from 
the provisions of Article 25 of the Law of 2 July 1996 (such as insurance and 
reinsurance companies, mutual investment funds, the French Treasury, 
Banque de France, French Post etc.), or a non resident establishment with 
comparable status. 
- The transferred securities must not be affected during the term of the transfer 
by an event changing their characteristics, such as a conversion or exchange 
of bonds into shares. 
- The transferred assets must not be held by the collateral taker for longer than 
one year. 
- The pledged assets are transferred as from the date of entry into force of the 
Law of 2 July 1996 or 6 July 1996. 
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If these requirements are not met, the securities transferred under the pledge have to 
be valued at mark-to-market if they qualify as transaction securities. In this case 
income tax will be levied from the collateral provider upon the transfer of securities, 
and from the collateral taker upon the transfer of equivalent securities at the end of 
the transaction. 
 
 
2. Tax position collateral taker – corporate income tax 
 
At the return of the assets previously transferred as a pledge, the collateral taker 
cancels its debt to the collateral provider, this cancellation being counterbalanced by 
the disappearance of the assets from its balance sheet. In principle, this transaction is 
neutral for the collateral taker from a tax standpoint, unless it meanwhile sold the 
assets and has to repurchase them on the market in order to honour its equitable 
obligation. 
 
 
3. Withholding tax credits 
 
According to the French tax code, if the entitlement to the coupon and entitlement of 
repayment of principal is divided between separate corporate entities, or of any treaty 
having the same effect, and when an entity incorporated or having its registered office 
outside of France holds all or part of the rights other than the rights to the dividends, 
the dividend tax credit is only allotted to the beneficiary of the dividends if the 
stripping or the treaty do not have the effect of granting a tax credit which would not 
have existed were there is no stripping or treaty. 
 
When the transferred assets consist of securities or negotiable debt instruments, the 
collateral agreement may provide that the coupons relating to the pledged securities 
received by the collateral taker are in principle immediately repaid by the latter to the 
collateral provider. In particular, where share revenue from French companies is 
involved which entitles the bearer to a tax credit and if the shares are registered in the 
collateral taker’s share account, only the latter has the capacity of shareholder and 
subsequently the right to a tax credit. The collateral provider, unless otherwise 
stipulated in the document, is only repaid the dividend itself, exclusive of the tax 
credit. It is therefore in a less advantageous tax situation than if it had kept the shares. 
 
When the transferred assets are shares and the collateral provider remains the legal 
title holder of the shares, one may consider the repayment of dividends (when they 
are not directly paid into the hands of the collateral provider but to the collateral taker 
as beneficiary) as a dividend payment because the beneficiary plays the role of 
collecting agent. The view that the repayment is a dividend must be rejected when the 
shares are transferred to the collateral taker in full ownership and when this transfer is 
valid with respect to third parties, such as in case of a pledge with a right of use. The 
view whereby dividend repayment by the beneficiary to the collateral provider is an 
indemnity may then be put forward. An indemnity payment is not subject to 
withholding tax. 
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D) SPAIN 
 
Spanish tax effects of the ‘right of use’ granted under Article 5 of the Collateral 
Directive 
 
 
1. Tax position collateral provider – corporate income tax 
 
As a general rule, the transfer of legal title of an asset is considered as a disposal of 
the asset by the collateral provider for corporate tax purposes. If the collateral 
provider is a Spanish tax resident company, such capital gain/loss would be included 
in the taxable income at a rate of 35%. However, if the transfer does not lead to a 
change of legal ownership and the collateral provider also maintains the economic 
ownership of the securities, no capital gain will be triggered under the Spanish tax 
law. Subsequently, if one should conclude that a pledge with a right of use is similar 
to an outright transfer, such a pledge would thus lead to a taxable disposal. Please 
note that securities lending transactions generate, as a general rule, taxable gains 
unless these transactions falls within the specific tax-exemption as laid down in the 
Spanish Tax Act (see paragraph 3 below). 
 
 
2. Tax position collateral taker – corporate income tax 
 
On the assumption that the original transfer of the asset under a collateral agreement 
gives rise to a capital gain/loss for the original collateral provider (due to the fact that 
legal ownership is transferred), the return of the asset by the collateral taker would 
also generate a taxable gain (or loss) in the hands of the collateral taker. 
 
 
3. Deferral by recharacterisation into a securities lending transaction 
 
There is no possibility to defer the tax claim, save for the vague provision (subject to 
further development) regarding the derecognition of a capital gain on a securities 
lending transaction under specific circumstances. 
 
Under Law 6/2000, a securities lending transaction does not give rise to a capital gain 
if all the requirements established in the Stock Market Act (L 24/1998) are met. 
These requirements concern the type of securities that can be used in the lending 
transaction and other requirements such as, the securities must have belonged to the 
lender, the lender is entitled to receive the economic benefits of the securities and the 
securities must be free of charges. 
 
 
4. Withholding tax credits 
 
Given that the collateral taker would become the legal owner of the securities under a 
collateral agreement including the right of use, he will be the one entitled to collect 
the dividends or to claim a refund under the applicable double tax treaty, if any. The 
fact that the collateral taker pays a manufactured dividend to the collateral provider 
will have no effect on the tax treatment of the dividend paid on these assets. 
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Spanish tax law sets forth that a credit for foreign withholding tax is attributed to the 
taxpayer, i.e., the legal owner (the shareholder) of the securities and who includes the 
dividend in its taxable income. Therefore the collateral taker (when this is a Spanish 
resident) is the one who will be entitled to the foreign tax credit. 
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E) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
U.S. tax effects of a ‘right of use’ 
 
 
1. Tax position collateral provider – corporate income tax 
 
In general, a transfer of title to assets, without a transfer of ‘control’ (i.e., the ability 
to exercise an owner’s rights), is not a taxable event. However, under a pledge with a 
right of use, control is effectively transferred over the pledged assets to the collateral 
taker.218 Subject to the discussion in paragraph 2 below, such a transfer of title and 
control generally is a taxable disposition for U.S. federal income tax purposes. 
 
 
2. Tax position collateral taker – corporate income tax 
 
A return of the securities would constitute a taxable disposition if under the initial 
transfer the control over the assets was transferred and the transfer did not qualify as a 
securities lending transaction under Section 1058 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code 
(‘IRC’). 
 
 
3. Deferral by recharacterisation into a securities lending transaction 
 
To the extent the pledged assets are securities, the transfer may be recharacterised as 
a securities lending transaction which transfers in principle tax ownership, but does 
not result in a taxable disposition under Section 1058 of the IRC. To qualify as a 
Section 1058 of the IRC securities lending transaction, the securities lending 
agreement generally must (i) be in writing, (ii) provide for the return to the collateral 
provider of securities identical to the securities transferred (i.e., securities of the same 
class and issue or equivalent securities in the event of a reorganisation, 
recapitalisation or merger of the issuer of the securities); (iii) require that payments 
shall be made to the collateral provider of amounts equivalent to all interest, 
dividends, and other distributions which the owner of the securities is entitled to 
receive during the period beginning with the transfer of the securities by the collateral 
provider and ending with the transfer of identical securities back to the collateral 
provider; and (iv) not reduce the risk of loss or opportunity for gain of the collateral 
provider of the securities in the securities transferred. Market participants generally 
take the position that the posting of collateral is not a taxable disposition for U.S. 
federal income tax purposes.219
                                                 
218 It should be noted that at least one commentator believes that the ability to sell or rehypothecate 
pledged assets should not result in a taxable disposition until such power is actually exercised. This 
opinion is not supported, however, by existing case law. 
219 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that Proposed Regulations under Section 1058 of 
the IRC, which were promulgated in 1983 before the explosive growth of the derivatives market, 
contain a technical requirement that the collateral provider have the right to terminate the securities 
lending agreement upon 5 business days’ notice. The Proposed Regulations have not yet been finalised 
and are not currently on the regulatory business plan of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Moreover, 
the ‘5 business day’ requirement is clearly out of step with current market practice in the derivatives 
market. Thus, the Proposed Regulations should not have an impact on the qualification of the 
transactions contemplated by the Annex under Section 1058 of the IRC. 
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A pledge with the right of use should be treated as a securities lending transaction. If 
it were not, the collateral provider would likely recognise gain or loss on the transfer 
of the collateral provided to the collateral taker under generally applicable tax rules. 
The gain generally would be treated as capital gain if the collateral were a capital 
asset in the hands of the collateral provider. Such gain would be a long-term capital 
gain if the collateral has been held for more than one year prior to the transfer to the 
collateral taker. If the collateral provided were inventory, accounts or notes 
receivable, or short-term discount U.S. government obligations, inter alia, in the 
hands of the collateral provider, the gain generally would be treated as ordinary 
income for U.S. federal income tax purposes. 
 
 
4. Withholding tax credits 
 
If the right of use is not vested, then the collateral taker is generally viewed as the 
agent of the collateral provider in collecting any dividends or interest. In respect to 
cross-border collateral the double tax treaty, if any, concluded between the states in 
which collateral provider and collateral taker are incorporated, will apply. 
 
If the right of use is transferred to the collateral taker and the pledge is considered a 
securities lending transaction under Section 1058 of the IRC, then any dividends or 
interest are beneficially owned by the collateral taker and the collateral taker is 
entitled to treaty benefits. With respect to substitute dividend and interest payments 
paid by the collateral taker to the collateral provider under the collateral agreement, 
the source and, if the payee is a non-U.S. resident, the character of any such payments 
are determined on a look-through basis for U.S. federal tax purposes. Accordingly, if 
on a look-through basis such payments are U.S. source, then U.S. withholding tax 
may apply subject to the portfolio interest exemption, which exempts interest income 
from U.S. tax, or any applicable treaty benefits (see Treas. Reg. Section 1.864-1(c), 
which provides that the Interest and Dividends provisions of a double tax treaty will 
apply to substitute interest or dividends paid to or derived by a foreign person). 
 
If the right of use is transferred to the collateral taker and the pledge is not considered 
a securities lending transaction under Section 1058 of the IRC, then any dividends 
and interest are also beneficially owned by the collateral taker and the collateral taker 
is entitled to treaty benefits. Nevertheless, substitute interest and dividend payments 
would not be recharacterised or resourced on a look-through basis. The 
characterisation of such payments for U.S. federal tax purposes is not clear, but they 
likely would be considered in the nature of a fee for the use of property which fees 
are exempt from withholding tax. 
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